Palestinian ‘Al-Hayat’ Columnist On Tel Aviv Attack: The Armed Struggle Harms The Palestinians More Than It Helps Them
MEMRI/June 20, 2016 Special Dispatch No.6484
In his June 12, 2016 column in the London daily Al-Hayat, Majed Kayali responded to the terror attack at Tel Aviv’s Sarona Market complex, criticizing the tactic of armed struggle which he said that over the years has harmed the Palestinians more than helped them. He said that even if the attack had elements of heroism and sacrifice, and even if it could be seen as a natural response to the occupation, it did not help the Palestinians but only gave Israel an opportunity to take countermeasures, and also did damage to the Palestinian struggle’s global legitimacy and image. According to him, the current manifestation of the armed struggle, that is, attacks by individuals, reveals a clear lack of Palestinian strategy, and shows the helplessness of the Palestinian leadership as well as the Palestinian resistance factions. Adding that under the current difficult circumstances, on both on the Palestinian and the regional levels, there can be no liberation of Palestinian land, he called on the Palestinians to focus on rebuilding their society and political entities, formulate a political vision that is appropriate for the Palestinian problem, and choose ways of struggle that benefit them, as the First Intifada did.
Following are excerpts from his column: [1]
“The Tel Aviv operation that targeted Israelis at one of the restaurants took us back to the days of the Second Intifada, 2000-2004, which saw an escalation of attacks against restaurant, attractions, buses, and markets.
“It is interesting that our collective mind, which relies on emotions, slogans, and sanctifying the armed struggle, forgets, in those moments of enthusiasm and vengeance, the lessons learned from the past and the heavy toll that we have paid, without obtaining the desired benefits from operations like this and with a disproportion of victims versus achievements…
“By any standard, we can view this operation as a natural response to the occupation, the settlements, and the arrogant and racist Israeli policy. But at the same time it is also a product of a divisive culture and of the factions’ inability to create a culture of resistance that is appropriate to the capabilities of the Palestinian people, to the circumstances, and to the time. Therefore, it is possible to differentiate between the spirit of heroism and sacrifice shown by those carrying out the operation and the fact that [this operation] was a spontaneous act by an individual, in isolation from any political context or context of struggle in the strategic sense.
“With regard to the moral aspect, it can be said that the imperialist, racist, and usurping Israel is responsible for everything that happens to the Palestinians – their frustration, and their sense of oppression and rage. But this operation, which targeted civilians, damages the credibility of their struggle. It can be assumed that [the Palestinians] have become more aware of, and sensitive to, this issue [of preserving credibility], in light of the increased sympathy worldwide for [the Palestinian] problem and rights, and the increased calls to isolate Israel and boycott it politically and culturally in Europe, and even in the U.S….
“The idea here is that sacrifice and heroism are not enough, and that they do not prevent the severe or disproportionate consequences that they could bring about, because they are the actions of individuals, disconnected from any agenda or faction. The problem, it seems, is that the [Palestinian] factions welcome these operations [by individuals], in an attempt to cover up their helplessness. [But] such operations expose the lack of a clear strategy for a Palestinian struggle after half a century of the national movement’s existence, and reveal that the Palestinians’ armed struggle activity is random and depends on mood and on trial and error.
“Aside from the moral aspect, the drawback of this operation and others like it is that they are unrelated to any political solution [while at the same time] do not emanate from any capability to continue this form of struggle – particularly in light of the upheavals in the Arab world and the devastation of state and society in Syria and Iraq. Israel, which launched three devastating wars in Gaza in 2008, 2012, and 2014 without anyone stopping it, may perhaps seize the opportunity in these circumstances to launch a new war on Gaza, and maybe even take steps to uproot thousands or tens of thousands of Palestinians and drive them out of, say, Jerusalem or Hebron. We have already seen the world’s lenience towards the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, who killed hundreds of thousands of his own people, destroyed their homes, and drove out millions. How will this world act against Israel, if it only did to the Palestinians a quarter of [what Assad did to his people]?
“Additionally, the Palestinians’ problem is that they are not examining their historical experience critically. Where was the armed Palestinian struggle when it began in the mid-1960s, and where is it now? The Second Intifada, 2000-2004, saw the largest conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, with the latter suffering heavy loss of life… but [Israel ultimately] succeeded in neutralizing the resistance while negotiating with the Palestinian national movement, reoccupying the West Bank, and abusing the Palestinians. Furthermore, it prevented the Palestinians from entering Jerusalem without a permit; it erected the separation fence; it built dozens of settlements; and it set up checkpoints between the cities and villages of the West Bank.
“I do not mean to say that the Palestinians should give up the struggle and surrender. But they must know which form of struggle is most effective – like the First Intifada, for example – and must balance cost and benefit, and wear down their enemies, rather than becoming worn down themselves. The resistance must consider the people’s steadfastness, endurance, and ability to develop Palestinian society and strengthen its political entities – because otherwise this form of resistance will do Israel no harm, but will make it easier for it to divide Palestinian society and wear down and subjugate the Palestinians.
“Naturally, some will ask what the alternative [to armed struggle] is; this is the opportunity to emphasize that the author of these lines does not see negotiations or the Oslo Accords as the path to Palestinian rights. That is, the Palestinian experiment has failed, in both negotiations and resistance, due to a lack of strategic political vision as well as the weakness, calcification, and lethargy of the Palestinian political infrastructure (PLO, PA, and the organizations). As for the question of the alternative that seems impossible – the answer is simple: There is no use walking on a path that is a proven failure and has caused damage…
“Therefore, under the current difficult circumstances, both within and without, the best thing for the Palestinians is to gather their strength and not to enable Israel to take advantage of what is happening in the region to strike them and to dismantle their society – because under these circumstances it is impossible to liberate even an inch of Palestine and to weaken Israel, in light of the events in the Arab world.
“Under these circumstances, it would be best for the Palestinians to reassess [their course of action], with a critical and responsible approach; to rebuild their society inside [the PA] and out [in the diaspora]; to restore consensus; and to rebuild their political entities on new foundations and in accordance with a political vision that is appropriate for the Palestinian problem, the Palestinian people, and the land of Palestine. It is best for the Palestinians to undertake forms of struggle that are appropriate for the people’s capabilities, and not to allow Israel to use its unrestrained force to wear down and dismantle Palestinian society.”
Endnotes:
[1] Al-Hayat (London), June 12, 2016.