Reconfiguring the Arab region and its global space
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/October 21/15
How is the Arab region realigning itself in light of the new regional-international alliances and what is its place in the international landscape, beyond the traditional classification of the region in terms of its economic role and the huge security challenges it faces led by ISIS and its ilk? When raising this question, and because of the overt Russian military intervention in Syria now, the Syrian issue becomes one of major importance in the future of the region and global relations, led by U.S.-Russian relations. However, Syria in reality is not the only benchmark by which we should gauge the realignment of the Arab region in the international arena, while the intent is not to bypass at all raging crises and conflicts, such as those in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq, nor latent ones such as those in Lebanon, Egypt, or Tunisia. The intent is that the re-alignment requires long-term strategies that accompany the necessary immediate-term ones to end the conflicts, because they pose serious obstacles to the growth and development of Arab societies, which would help take young people towards fulfilling normal aspirations, instead of falling victim to polarization, extremism, and terrorism. A summit of the Beirut Institute in Abu Dhabi held this week brought together several prominent intellectuals and strategists from around the world to discuss what the new realignment requires and what mechanisms should be established to build a positive framework in the Arab region, covering regional and international relations as well. The summit saw many boldly admit American, Russian, and Arab mistakes, but went beyond diagnosing and confessing to failed policies and their repercussions, to discussing ideas regarding what should be done in earnest. The conversations tackled Arab-Iranian, especially Saudi-Iranian, relations; Gulf-Russian relations, which continue to develop despite differences and drawbacks; and the future of Arab-American relations after the current administration and in light of President Obama’s policies. Full disclosure: I am the founder and executive chairperson of the Beirut Institute, an Arab think-tank. The summit, which was held last weekend in the UAE capital, had support from the host country and brought together senior officials, ministers, former heads of state, and leaders of intellect, politics, and arts from around the world. Several prominent figures from the Arab world sit on the board of the independent think tank, information about which can be found on www.beirutinstitute.org and via Facebook and Twitter.
Syrian tragedy
Naturally, the Syrian tragedy currently overshadows all other crises, despite the importance of what is taking place in Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. The main question here is this: Is Russia in the process of successfully altering internal Syrian equations, and what does Russia really want? Does the United States or the Gulf bless what Russia is doing? Or is Russia being lured into a quagmire in Syria? It is indisputable that the absence and reluctance of the Obama administration to engage in Syria has encouraged Moscow to fill the vacuum, with Russia now repositioning itself in the Middle East. Washington may not mind for Moscow to occupy an exceptional strategic position through Syria, because the Obama administration has decided that the U.S. interest lies in pivoting east, away from the Middle East. The official Russian pretext for the intervention in Syria is an official request for help from the “legitimate” government in Damascus. Moscow rightly argues that the United States did not question the legitimacy of the Syrian government when it signed agreements over the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal in the wake of a U.S.-Russian agreement, when Obama famously backed down from his “red lines”. Moscow is right because that agreement, which Washington signed through the Security Council, meant that Obama and Washington had backtracked from considering that Assad has lost his legitimacy as Obama had previously said.At the Beirut Institute, the discussions during the public and closed sessions argued that the Russian intervention in Syria could have been a positive development, if military activities were coordinated on the basis of political understandings. According to one figure closely familiar with Obama’s policies, these understandings would not mind if Russia gained a leading, permanent position in Syria as a foothold in the region. However, President Putin would be mistaken if he believes that Washington would consent to maintaining Bashar al-Assad a permanent president atop the ruins of Syria. For one thing, this would implicate the United States in a confrontation that it does not need with an important segment of the Arab peoples and important nations that the United States still maintains strategic relations with, such as Saudi Arabia. Syria in reality is not the only benchmark by which we should gauge the realignment of the Arab region in the international arena, while the intent is not to bypass at all raging crises and conflicts, such as those in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq, nor latent ones such as those in Lebanon, Egypt, or Tunisia. Meanwhile, talk about “Afghanization” emerged on many occasions during discussions at the summit. It is clear that the U.S. administration would not be able to disengage militarily from Syria, while Russia’s forces strike the Syrian opposition to rescue the Assad regime, under the pretext of crushing ISIS or al-Nusra Front. One of the participants, a senior military man, said something to the effect of: if you attack our men, we will attack yours. In other words, Washington, should it decide to, could reach Moscow’s men in Syria, and the men of Iran and allied Hezbollah. Not long ago, U.S. Stinger missiles were being used by mujahidin in Afghanistan to shoot down Soviet planes. Today, U.S. TOW anti-Tank missiles are being used against Syrian regime armor. The difference is important today, because Washington is not targeting Moscow in the Syrian airspace, yet the TOW missiles are a turning point that goes beyond the program of training the armed Syrian opposition.
Not hiding concerns
Some Russians are not hiding their concerns regarding what they see as Vladimir Putin’s adventurism, declaring war on Sunni extremism when there is a large Sunni Muslim minority in his country, which is also surrounded by five Muslim-majority republics. He is also partnering up with Iran and Hezbollah on the ground, which also plays into the hands of those Sunni extremists bent on revenge. Even if the speculation that Russia intends to curb Iranian incursions in Syria are true, this remains a huge gamble. Some say that Putin is falling into a U.S. trap, blinded by his arrogance. These voices say that Putin would be making a grave mistake if he did not accept Saudi and Gulf overtures calling him to be vigilant, and offering him to regain influence in the Arab region provided that he stops reducing Syria to the person of Bashar al-Assad. These nations are extending an olive branch to Russia, at a time when Putin is resorting to the gun. These countries want to save Syria – and Russia – without demanding Putin disengages with Iran, proceeding from their pragmatic thinking and their quest for good strategic, economic, and political ties. This pragmatism and the quest for new, creative ideas were clear at the sessions of the Beirut Institute. Some spoke of practical steps to establish new structures for inter-Arab work, Arab-regional work, and Arab-international work. Specific recommendations will be issued based on the results of the brainstorming that took place at the summit. The Beirut Institute Abu Dhabi Summit Declaration dealt with issues that similar conferences did not tackle. For example, the declaration urged Arab nations to join the ICC, to strengthen accountability and end impunity. Indeed, prosecuting the Israeli occupation and its violations is possible after the State of Palestine joined the Rome Statute, becoming a party to the ICC.
The declaration stressed the need for multilateral efforts to end the conflict in Syria, including developing a clear vision for the post-conflict phase and establishing a Gulf fund to help rebuild infrastructure destroyed in the years of the war in Syria and other countries, such as Yemen, Libya, and Iraq.
The declaration also stressed the need to achieve regional economic development through a comprehensive plan, including establishing a regional proactive fund headquartered in the GCC for future development. This is in addition to expediting the promotion of Arab mutual relations and moving forward with efforts meant to establish a new regional order that can deal with various challenges, such as state and non-state terrorism, the refugee crisis, and economic disintegration. The declaration stressed the need for diversifying sources of income, and promoting economic, political, and security institutions in the region, adopting successful models such as ASEAN.
The declaration also called for intensifying efforts to seriously address the Palestinian question on the basis of the two-state solution, in order to reach a peace treaty between Israel and Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. With regard to youth, a call was made to launch an intensive campaign to integrate Arab youths economically, through a new approach based on technology to create job opportunities and spur entrepreneurship, in tandem with education and apprenticeship to employ graduates as part of developing a new digital economy and infrastructure. The conferees, through the declaration, also called for strengthening regional administration and the rule of law, and for efforts to be stepped up to empower women as natural antidotes to extremism, in addition to including the private sector in political discussions. They also stressed the need to strengthen accountability and achieve real progress against corruption.
Because of the tragedies, instability, anxiety, frustration, and fear afflicting the region, the summit called for establishing a new institute to train Arabic-speaking psychologists to address the repercussions of trauma in the Arab region. The talk about the realignment of the Arab region in the international arena is not purely political. It requires non-traditional thinking to develop creative solutions for the future, in partnership with new generations, away from isolationism. The Beirut Institute Abu Dhabi Summit launched this debate, and the debate will surely be continued.
This article was first published in al-Hayat on Oct. 16, 2015 and translated by Karim Traboulsi.
Despite risk of $62 fine for not voting, less than 20% of Egyptians bothered to show up at polls
Ayah Aman/Al-Monitor/October 21/15
CAIRO — Voters’ indifference and lack of participation marred the first round of parliamentary elections conducted in 14 governorates. Yet, electoral observers expected such an outcome in these Egyptian elections, due to the lack of an effective popular base eager to hold elections, amid a political atmosphere replete with frustration for many political parties and factions, as well as for ordinary people on the street.Throughout the two days of voting, Oct. 18-19, conflicting figures emerged as to the percentage of voters casting their ballots after the Supreme Electoral Commission announced on the first day of voting that the initial estimated rate of participation was only 1.2% as of the middle of Oct. 18. This figure raised the ire of the government and official media outlets, which mobilized to urge voters to participate through extensive media campaigns that blanketed official television station airwaves under the slogan of “Inzil” (come down). Low participation figures sparked cynicism on social networking sites, despite anticipatory statements by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on Oct. 17, the eve of the first day of elections, urging voters to participate: “I call on you to rally strongly once again, in order to complete this last milestone that we all agreed upon.” He added, “Egyptian youth must take the lead on election day.”The government did try to contain the issue, with the Council of Ministers declaring Oct. 18 that the workday on the second day of elections would be cut in half and end at 11 a.m. in order to encourage employees to head to the polling stations. In parallel, the minister of local development, Ahmed Zaki Bader, on Oct. 19 threatened laggards with the law, insinuating that those who were registered but refrained from voting without a valid excuse (which the law does not specify) would be fined 500 Egyptian pounds ($62) in accordance with Article 57 of the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights.A number of military vehicles roamed the perimeter of some polling stations in Giza governorate during the first day of balloting to invite citizens to vote to the tune of patriotic music, while the governor of Alexandria, Hani al-Misery, proclaimed on the second day of voting that the use of public transportation would be free on election day.
On Oct. 19, Prime Minister Sherif Ismail, after conducting a quick visit to the Council of Ministers’ situation room, issued a statement indicating that “voting rates had reached 16%,” although the head of the Judges Club, Abdallah Fathi, announced that “participation on the first day did not exceed 2%, and reached 6% on the second day.”In field visits conducted by Al-Monitor during the two days of voting to four polling stations in the Dokki and Agouza districts of Giza governorate, low turnout rates were noted in districts where a number of political and media icons were running, such as independent studies professor Amr el-Shobaki, Ahmad Mortada Mansour, the son of the Zamalek soocer club chairman, and Abdul Rahim Ali, the editor-in-chief of a daily newspaper, al-Bawaba news. As she headed to cast her vote, Mirfat Hussein, 50, told Al-Monitor, “I am participating out of fear that Islamists and remnants of the old regime would prevail. But I do not expect to be well represented in parliament.” Along the same lines, a number of young people interviewed by Al-Monitor on the outskirts of Dokki and Agouza neighborhoods indicated that they lacked confidence in parliament and its ability to echo the opinions of the Egyptian people. In that regard, Mohamed Hosni, 20, said, “I do not have a lot of trust in the candidates … and do not expect them to back youth-related issues.”
Hazem Baily, 37, disapprovingly said, “I did not know that there were elections being held in the first place.”Political activist Safwan Mohammed talked with Al-Monitor about the reluctance of young people to participate, and said, “Lack of participation by the youth in these elections is clear to everyone; the reason simply is that most young political front-runners in Egypt are currently jailed.”Safwan, who was a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 2011, added, “The absence of a free political climate deprives parliament of its importance. Not to mention the lack of a mechanism guaranteeing pluralism.”
Egypt’s first round of parliamentary elections at a glance
2,573 candidates competing for individual seats.
8 electoral lists in the West Delta and Upper Egypt Districts.
103 general committees and 5,460 ballot stations.
27,102,000 eligble voters.
16,000 judges supervising the elections.
81 Egyptian and 6 foreign organizations monitoring the elections.
The first and second round of parliamentary election voting will cost 1.5 billion Egyptian pounds.
An initial tally indicates that the For the Love of Egypt list will win a majority when it comes to list voting. The low voter turnout in the first round of these parliamentary elections raises questions as to the legitimacy and popular base of the next parliament, which will be formed amid political turmoil and probably be controlled by men affiliated with Sisi and people who are strong defenders of his opinions. While low turnout may affect the election’s overall legitimacy at home and abroad, there is no legal basis for such an occurrence to overturn the election. Constitutional law expert Mohammad Nour Farhat told Al-Monitor, “Weak participation is a serious indicator of the Egyptian street’s dissatisfaction in relation to elections that have been long delayed, since the adoption of the July 2013 road map. Parliament will lack political and popular legitimacy, but will retain its legality.” Based on information gathered by Al-Monitor from the Council of Ministers’ situation room, the campaign headquarters of political parties, and the reports of observers from Egyptian organizations, Al-Monitor noted that a number of concerns were raised about the tardiness and failure of a number of judges to assume their electoral supervisory roles; this forced the Supreme Electoral Commission to merge, on the first day of voting, 89 committees in a number of governorates due to the shortage of judges and advisers. For its part, the Judges Club announced on the same day that some judges had received threatening anonymous phone messages to dissuade them from taking part in the elections.
In this regard, the spokesman for the Judges Club stated to Al-Monitor, “Those messages were reported and are being investigated.”
Yet, he denied that they were the reasons for the reluctance of some judges to participate in the elections, and added, “The judges are working hand in hand with the state to make these elections a success. Adequate measures have been taken to safeguard the participation of judges during the two electoral days.”
Of note during the first round of elections was the introduction of two electoral districts for Nubia, Halayeb and Shalateen, which were unrepresented in previous parliaments. Compared with the fluid situation in other first-round districts, turnout in those two new districts was relatively better, for reasons that observers attribute to the desire of their inhabitants to be represented in parliament, where their interests may be defended. Voting by Egyptians abroad — which the political regime is waging on for support — was not much different from the trend back home. Preliminary count results from Egyptian embassies abroad from Ministry of Foreign Affairs data obtained by Al-Monitor indicated that participation levels were less than expected, with Kuwait (8,000 voters) and Saudi Arabia (5,000 voters) recording the highest voter turnout, with the For the Love of Egypt list garnering a majority of votes and the Salafist Nour Party’s list receiving the least number of votes; the results will be officially announced Oct. 21.
As initial first-round ballot counts indicated that regime loyalists in the For the Love of Egypt list would prevail with the emergence of a number of candidates not known for their opposition to the regime, observers told Al-Monitor that they expected the second round to follow the same general trend and lack strong participation overall; still, they expected that there would be some attempts by candidates to mobilize people and even to resort to electoral bribes — a few such cases were recorded in the first round of voting.
**Ayah Aman is an Egyptian journalist for Al-Shorouk specializing in Africa and the Nile Basin, Turkey and Iran, and internal Egyptian social issues.