Russian-Israeli relations reach new heights
Yossi Mekelberg/Al Arabiya/December 02/15
A hastily arranged meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu back in September caused some raising of eyebrows. It took place almost immediately after Russia made its intentions known to intervene militarily in Syria. This was enough to raise the alarm bells among the decision makers in Israel to seek an urgent meeting, aimed at ensuring that both countries’ interests would not clash over the Syrian skies. Accompanied by top Israeli generals for his talks with Putin, Netanyahu sought to coordinate Russian military operations in Syria with Moscow to avoid both accidental firing inside Israel, as well as clashes between the two air forces. After the meeting the Israeli prime minister said somewhat cryptically, that “In Syria, I’ve defined my goals. They’re to protect the security of my people and my country. Russia has different goals. But they shouldn’t clash.”
The current concern in Israel is that the theater of war in Syria is becoming increasingly congested with international actors, especially Russia, and consequently its maneuvering room there is becoming increasingly restricted. Considering the escalation in relations between Turkey and Russia as a result of the downing of the Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft last week, the importance of such military coordination in the currently congested Syrian airspace became obvious. In contrast, when a Russian warplane recently erroneously entered Israeli-controlled airspace from Syria, it was warned and immediately returned to Syria without further frictions. In the relatively small Syrian airspace, the U.S.-led international coalition and Russian and Israeli air forces are carrying out a considerable number of sorties. Not all of them have the same aims in mind, though with the exception of Israel, they are all committed to destroying ISIS. Nevertheless, they also run the risk of clashing with one another. Only time will tell whether a very irritated Turkey was just looking for an opportunity to shoot down a Russian fighter jet, as an act of deterrence from future violations of its airspace, or rather if there was an agenda regarding the nature of the war in Syria. Whatever the circumstances of this incident, it is precisely the sort of situation, bearing in mind its far-reaching implications, that Israel wants to avoid. The conundrum for Israel is how to achieve this target without compromising its strategic aims in Syria.
Air superiority
For decades Israel has had complete superiority in patrolling the skies of both Syria and Lebanon. It enabled intensive intelligence gathering and, on occasion, the carrying out of military operations. The country’s two fundamental strategic aims in Syria have not changed since the war in its northern neighbor’s country began. Its primary concern was to ensure that weapons and ammunition, which could change the balance of power between the Jewish state and Hezbollah, would not be transferred from or through Syria to the Iranian-backed Lebanese movement. While Hezbollah is one of the backbones of support for Bashar al-Assad, it is regarded as an arch enemy by the Israelis. The second red line drawn by the Israeli security was to deter the ‘leaking’ of Syrian hostilities into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, or even further into Israel proper. This two-tier approach has been adhered to for nearly five years by attacking suspected arms convoys and thus stopping them from heading toward Hezbollah’s strongholds. Israel has also been responding with, mostly restrained, military power to any firing across the border with Syria. The current concern in Israel is that the theater of war in Syria is becoming increasingly congested with international actors, especially Russia, and consequently its maneuvering room there is becoming increasingly restricted.
Converging and conflicting interests
Russia and Israel have both converging and conflicting interests in war-torn Syria. Originally Israel was rather agnostic over whether it was in its best interests for the Assad regime to survive in power. But considering the alternatives to the current regime in Damascus and especially the rise of ISIS, Israel is tacitly getting closer to Russia’s position that the survival of the current regime in Syria is in its best interest. However, for the Assad regime to prevail, Israel has to swallow the bitter pill of Iranian and Hezbollah active involvement in Syria for probably a very long time. These concerns are surmounted by Israel’s uneasiness about the sale of Russian S-300 anti-air missiles to Iran and the visit this year to Moscow by Qassem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds force, which is regarded by Israel as a threatening entity. Relations between Israel and Russia under Putin have improved in recent years, as has military cooperation.
These developments are perceived by the Israeli decision makers as an existential, direct, and immediate threat. Netanyahu went as far, in a recent interview with CNN, to imply that Iran might attempt to transfer nuclear weapons to Hezbollah. He warned that no one would stop his country from averting such an eventuality. Regardless of the customary Netanyahu nuclear rhetoric, Israel is genuinely troubled by the transfer of advanced military conventional capability to Hezbollah. Nevertheless, if thwarting it runs the risk of a direct Turkey-like clash with Russia, then at least avoiding an accidental clash is an imperative for both countries. Both Moscow and Jerusalem will have to handle this new situation with great caution. Relations between Israel and Russia under Putin have improved in recent years, as has military cooperation. Recently, for instance, Israel has agreed to sell 10 unmanned IAI Searcher 3 drones to Russia, despite concerns about the close military ties between Russia and Iran. Also on a political-personal level Netanyahu has a rather keen interest in nurturing a better understanding with Russia, especially if one considers his strained relations with American President Obama. However, in the ever-growing intricacies of the Middle East in general, and Syria in particular, Russia’s proximity to the Israeli border presents mixed fortunes for Israel.
Turkey needs to talk tough to calm Russia
Mahir Zeynalov/Al Arabiya/December 02/15
Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the first foreign leaders to visit the sumptuous palace of his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He even called the Turkish president a “firm leader.”These two leaders, popular at home but loathed in the West, courted each other for much of their more-than decade-long rule in their respective nations. They disagreed on Syria, along with many other regional issues, but kept ramping up bilateral trade. Russian tourists enjoyed Turkish resort towns; Turkish contractors struck lucrative deals in Russia. This strange relationship collapsed overnight when Turkish jets downed a Russian warplane for violating Turkish airspace. Russians were outraged. Turks were triumphant – until they realized how far Russians could go in making Turkey pay.
Russian surprise
Moscow’s reaction to the downing of its warplane was harsh: Putin described the incident as a “huge mistake” while Russian officials vowed that Turkey will pay the price. The focus of the first round of Russian sanctions against Turkey ranges from imports and tourism to football players. There is as yet no word on sanctions on the Russian energy supply, the area that Turkey fears could hurt it the most. Russian surprise is understandable. Throughout the Cold War and in its aftermath, Russia and the Western bloc had an understanding. Both jockeyed for geopolitical influence in many territories, but they knew exactly what their red lines were. This included tolerating the frequent violations of airspace. As part of this understanding, the U.S. and Russia agreed on an air-safety protocol in Syria to avoid unwanted incidents. Russia is out for blood and Turkish attempts to de-escalate the situation only increases the Russian appetite.
The agreement on air-space safety regarding Syria, where Russia and the U.S. are running separate air campaigns, did not include other coalition nations, according to the U.S. State Department. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, believes that Turkey violated this protocol by shooting down its aircraft. Turkey claims that its military rule of engagement on the Syrian border, in place since Syria shot down its plane in 2012, was made crystal clear and that Moscow was warned repeatedly about violating Turkey’s airspace. For Russia, which is frequently testing NATO’s airspace, this is no good reason to shoot down a plane.
ISIS oil business
To understand this incident, Russia came up with a rather bizarre explanation: Turkey shot down the Russian plane to defend its oil business with ISIS. Few days before the Russian jet incident, Russia announced that it hit at least 500 trucks that ISIS uses to smuggle oil. U.S. officials disputed the Russian figures as “exaggeration.” Last week, the Pentagon said it destroyed 399 trucks used to smuggle oil to Turkey and Iraq. Both Putin and Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev claimed that they have data to suggest that some Turkish officials are benefitting from this oil trade. Erdogan initially categorically rejected the “ugly slander,” but later said such oil trade, if any, could not be tied to the official government in Ankara. The Russian claim is astonishing beyond description. ISIS may smuggle oil into Turkey and several rogue local Turkish officials may benefit from this business. Turkish farmers would enjoy cheaper oil and they could not care less who is selling them. Turkey deserves blame for not fully cracking down on this illicit oil business. But shooting down a plane of a major power to defend this business does not make sense: Linking the jet incident to the ISIS oil business is ludicrous at best.
Putin Vs Erdogan
To explain Erdogan, Western pundits often draw parallels with Putin. Both are powerful leaders who rule their countries with an iron fist and with quite similar tactics. Round-the-clock anti-Turkish propaganda on Russian TV networks reeks of Turkey’s own version of defaming and demonizing opponents of Erdogan. Both leaders are also obsessed with their popularity at home. The shortcut to preserve their approval rating has mostly been ratcheting up the anti-Western rhetoric. Turkey’s soft rhetoric is exactly what fuels Russian antagonism. Being tough has always been the most effective weapon in containing Russian aggression. The downing of the Russian jet was a humiliating snub for Putin as he works hard to justify his adventure in Syria. To prop up his popularity, he needs to go on a major offensive against Erdogan. For several days, Ankara has been trying – quite unsuccessfully – to de-escalate the tensions and calm down Russia. This is what Turkey cannot understand: Russia is out for blood and Turkish attempts to de-escalate the situation only increases the Russian appetite. In handling Russia, perhaps Turkey could follow the path of the West, which has a long history of containing the Soviet expansionism and Russia’s imperial ambitions. This includes directly confronting Russia.
The case about the Russian supply of natural gas is highly exaggerated. Russia needs Turkish cash as much as Turkey needs the Russian gas. It would be foolish of Russia to push Turkey to find alternative gas suppliers. Russia could upset Turkish plans and designs in Syria, but the cost of losing Turkey is not small. As faithful followers of realpolitik, Russian policymakers will have to rethink its strategy of alienating Ankara. Moscow could partner up with Turkey to dilute NATO’s resolve in extending its security umbrella all the way to Ukraine and the Caspian Sea. To avoid irritating Russia, for example, Turkey kept silent when Russian forces occupied some parts of Georgia and Ukraine, both Turkey’s land and sea neighbors, over the past seven years. Since 1568, when Ottomans and Russians first fought, nine out of 12 Russian-Turkish battles were over Crimea. Turkey is also perhaps the only country that could destabilize Russia’s Chechen community, Putin’s everlasting nightmare. Turkey’s soft rhetoric is exactly what fuels Russian antagonism. Being tough has always been the most effective weapon in containing Russian aggression.
As Turkey confronts Russia, World War III looms ever closer
Maria Dubovikova/Al Arabiya/December 02/15
Right after the Russian fighter jet was downed by the Turkish F16 over Syria, most of the commentators expressed confidence that Moscow would not go to escalation over the incident. The reasons they gave were simple. Turkey did not join the Western sanctions following the Ukrainian crisis. Russia depends a lot on Turkish imports, and trade was rising. Russia needs Turkey to avoid gas transit to Europe through Ukraine. Turkey was the number one destination for Russian tourists, and the two countries have a lot of projects in the economic, industrial and energy spheres. The only point they missed in their analyses, however, was that Russia stopped being properly rational some time ago.