How the U.S. rebel program and policy on Syria failed
Brooklyn Middleton/Al Arabiya/September 23/15
The Russian military continued escalating its involvement in Syria this week while the United States essentially admitted that its official $500-million dollar rebel training program has so far utterly failed. The U.S. commander General Lloyd Austin, who is responsible for heading the war against ISIS, publicly admitted that only “four or five” U.S.-trained Syrian rebels were actually currently fighting against the militant group. If DC is attempting to overhaul the rebel-training program – and they clearly should – making the mistake of ignoring Assad, the number-one enemy, will only result in further failure.
Brooklyn Middleton
In a follow-up statement, that potentially secured the understatement of the year award, Austin noted that the rebel-training program had, in fact, “gotten off to a slow start.”Meanwhile, whether the CIA’s rebel training program – launched in 2013 – has been successful remains unclear. Yet the Washington Post reported in recent months that The House Intelligence Committee “voted unanimously to cut as much as 20 percent of the classified funds” allocated for the nearly billion dollar program that has seen approximately 10,000 fighters trained since its inception.
Divisions over Division 30
Worse yet, Colonel Mohammed Daher, chief of staff for the U.S.-trained and backed Division 30 Syrian rebel group, publicly announced his resignation from the program this week, citing at least six reasons for his decision. In an English translation from the Arabic provided by Business Insider, Daher notes the following issues:
“1. Slowness in the implementation of the training program of the 30th brigade and the lack of sufficient numbers of trainees
2. Failure of the 30th brigade to secure basic needs such as the ability to work
3. The lack of seriousness in the implementation of the project to establish the 30th brigade
4. The lack of census numbers of the 30th brigade members who are on the ground
5. The lack of accuracy and methodology in the selection of teams of the 30th brigade
6. The heterogeneity in the ideas of the trainees to achieve the objective on which the 30th brigade was created.”
Ignoring enemy No. 1
The reasons are unsurprising and highlight the deep failures of a program in desperate need of total overhaul. At the same time, several of the complaints, specifically numbers 2, 4 and 6, underscore the difficulty of facilitating unity among the Syrian fighters. This aspect of the program has no doubt been complicated, and often obliterated, by the fact that the United States has continuously failed to acknowledge that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains the primary enemy of opposition fighters – not ISIS. If DC is attempting to overhaul the rebel-training program – as they clearly should – making the mistake of ignoring the number-one enemy will only result in further failure. The latest damning evidence of the rebel-training program – that, notably, has already reportedly seen approximately $42 million squandered – occurred amid what appears to be the buildup to Russian airstrikes in Syria. The most recent reports via the New York Times indicated Moscow has now deployed over two dozen fighter jets in addition to a number of SAMs and aircraft equipped with air-to-air fighting capability. The latter two, John Kerry said, “raise serious questions.” Despite that Kerry said DC “welcomed” Russia’s fight against ISIS, he reiterated that Assad still has to go. But his remarks on the matter appeared softer than in the past, noting that “it doesn’t have to be on Day 1 or Month 1.”Such rhetoric, which seems to indicate that after more than 320,000 people have been killed and millions displaced there is plenty of time for Assad to depart, is a mistake. Russia’s involvement is far more likely to secure the Assad regime’s future in power, thus prolonging the bloody conflict. DC’s failure to acknowledge that could deal the final blow to U.S. policy on Syria.
Can Assad establish an Alawite state in Syria?
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/September 23/15
Can Syrian President Bashar al-Assad establish an Alawite state? The reason we ask this question is the unprecedented Russian military intervention in Syria, the biggest in the Middle East since the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers in 1972.
Russian military activity in Syria is mostly in Latakia and the coastal area extending to Tartus in the south. This area is viewed as a possible project for an Alawite state in case the regime collapses or the Syrian state disintegrates. Civil war will follow Assad wherever he goes in Syria.Russian forces, fighter jets and the construction of airports, residential compounds and warehouses in Syria can be clearly seen in the photos snapped by American satellites. These photos have pushed Washington to officially inquire about the Russians’ aims.
Russia sparks suspicion
My article last week – on whether Assad is seeking the help of the Russians to reduce the domination of its Iranian ally – was within the context of this scenario, and the dangerous development of the Russians’ intervention in Syria.We must however doubt the narrative of Assad’s dispute with the Iranians being the reason that he resorted to the Russians. We must doubt this for several reasons, such as the fact that the Iranians are stronger than the Russians in Syria, and that they also militarily surround Syria given their involvements in Iraq and Lebanon. Despite that, the intentions of Russian activity remains suspicious and its truth will not be revealed for a long time.
Dividing Syria a difficult aim
If we take the possibility of dividing Syria, and assume that Assad plans to resort to the coast of the Mediterranean to establish an Alawite state due to the increased attacks on the capital, then building such a state there and protecting it will be more difficult than maintaining governance in Syria.
There has been much talk of dividing Syria since the uprising of the Syrian people in 2011. It’s now in the spotlight again due to the Russians’ heavy presence around Latakia, the largest port city, and Tartus. The concept of dividing Syria is not as easy as some think, as most governments oppose it given the dangerous repercussions for regional countries. And previous divisions have proven that they increase the region’s problems, rather than put an end to them. The events since the divisions in Iraq in 1991 are an example of that. The international community, to this day, opposes the idea of the Iraqis’ act of solving their disputes via divisions – because such solutions merely divide Iraq into several states fighting together. There’s also the case of Somalia, which has been through a bitter experience ever since the regime collapsed following the death of President Siad Barre. Somalia has been in chaos for more than 20 years now, and it’s divided into at least three statelets, including Somaliland, which declared its independence two decades ago and it has its own government, police and currency; however, no one recognizes it.
Perpetual civil war
Therefore, if Assad escapes Damascus to Latakia or to Qardaha and decides to build his republic there, it will not guarantee international recognition. And there are two more dangerous factors about a potential Alawite state. The first is civil war, which will follow Assad wherever he goes in Syria. Assad will be the target of all angry Syrians and he will not be capable of providing permanent international protection for his new state. The second factor is that Alawites themselves will consider Assad a burden and will blame him for their disaster. We must not forget that most of the Alawite elites left the country to Europe and Gulf countries after the crisis erupted, as they were aware of the size of the threat Assad had subjected them to. There’s no reason that obliges the sons of the Alawite sect, which represents 10 percent of the population, to accept that the Assad family governs them. Former President Hafez al-Assad at least used patriotic and nationalistic slogans to unite the Syrians under his rule – but his son Bashar has entered a war against the majority of citizens, and he enabled some of his relatives to manage the country’s resources and assume high-ranking posts of authority. Assad is aware that there’s no place to go to if he leaves his castle in Damascus. This is why he rejects all the suggestions calling on him to step down and give up governance. To stay in power, he scarified 250,000 people and displaced more than 12 million. In addition, the barrel bombs his forces used have destroyed most cities. By the Iranians’ continuous presence in Syria and the emergence of Russian troops, the two allies – Russia and Iran – are playing a lost game in holding on to Assad. They are now trying to suggest ideas and send more troops so Assad remains in power. The question is: For how long will they bear the losses?