Why Russia wants to echo the Cuban Missile Crisis in Syria
Raed Omari/Al Arabiya/September 23/15
Russia’s recent escalation in Syria is about a lot more than an attempt to secure a foothold in the Middle East. I don’t think it would be an exaggeration to say that Moscow’s goal behind its deployment of weapons and military equipment in Syria was not simply to assist its ally President Bashar al-Assad, but to seize a historic moment brought about by the withdrawal of the United States from the region. For that strategic objective, Russia has partially succeeded in resurrecting some of the spirit of the Cold War. Moscow has ‘directed’ its escalation in Syria in a way to echo the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – during which the world held its breath for 13 agonizing days, as nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR seemed to lurch closer and closer. Russia’s Putin has sought to deliver a message to America that its stubborn stance on Syria will remain irreversible.
Soviet Union no more
Are we witnessing a new Cuban Missile Crisis between Moscow and Washington? The answer is definitely ‘no’ – simply because Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, nor can it be, just as Erdogan’s Turkey cannot be the Ottoman Empire. Things have changed. And, presumably, there are no nuclear-tipped missiles among the weapons the Russians have reportedly deployed in Syria – a country that, unlike Cuba, is far away from North America. Russia’s recent move in Syria also comes at a time when President Obama is particularly hands-off in the Middle East – and when America is busy with preparations for the next presidential election. Obama was unenthusiastic for any military action in Syria, or elsewhere, in the beginning of his second term – let alone in his last year in office. Obama, the reluctant war leader, is also tied up with many “peace commitments” he pledged to the American people.
A message to America
Despite the apparent triviality in comparing Moscow’s military buildup in Syria to the Cuban Missile Crisis, both involve sending a strong message to America. And Putin’s message is that his stubborn stance on Syria will remain irreversible even if that means sending troops on the ground to fight alongside Assad.
Russia has been seeking to become the “manager” of the Syrian crisis, and not just one of the key players, especially given that the consequences of Syria’s four-and-a half-year conflict have reached Europe. To achieve this endeavor, the Russians will continue advocating the war on terror in Syria, fully aware that the “nobility” and “allure” of the cause means no one will object. It is the Russians’ wish to depict the war in Syria solely in terms of the war on terror, so that they can achieve supremacy there. The war in Syria should be only on ISIS and radicalism; this is the notion the Russians have been trying to put across. Remarkably enough, the Syrian army jets have begun bombarding ISIS in Palmyra, with the story of the Russian weapons no longer, it seems, a secret.Moscow is trying to reach out boldly in the Middle East, partly to counter Washington’s attempts to cut off Moscow’s economic and political ties to the outside world. Washington’s policy of withdrawing from the Middle East allows Moscow to step forward as a stubborn adversary. Decisiveness, as opposed to prudence, has given the Kremlin – not the White House – a leading position in handling the world’s affairs.
How peace with Turkey emboldened the PKK
Mahir Zeynalov/Al Arabiya/September 23/15
People in Turkey jubilantly celebrated the Kurdish peace process for nearly three years, predicting that the negotiations could spawn an era of calm following three decades of conflict. They were unaware, however, that the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had exploited the lull in the conflict to replenish its forces, stock up on arms and increase its military posture. For years, critics and opposition parties asked the government to be more transparent in peace negotiations, and warned against the PKK’s increasingly visible posture in towns and cities in the southeast, where the rebel group is more active and dominant. It seems the government was aware of the situation all along. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan acknowledged in a live TV interview this month that the Kurdish rebel group had exploited the peace process to stock up on arms. Both sides must return to peace talks, with conditions that they must be held transparently with no strings attached.
Only last year, the Turkish army asked governors in three provinces for a permission to conduct military operations against PKK militants. Out of 110 demands in Sirnak, 100 in Hakkari and 80 in Tunceli, governors only allowed eight operations, revealing how the authorities tolerated the PKK activities in restive areas in southeast Turkey.
Presidential gambit
Erdogan’s primary goal to commit himself to a peace process was to have a chance to secure Kurdish support for his presidential ambitions. That tentative agreement with Kurds fell apart when Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas built his electoral campaign in early summer on a promise that his party would thwart Erdogan’s presidential bid. Erdogan’s former chief aide and current deputy prime minister Yalcin Akdogan acknowledged that the peace process was halted because Demirtas railed against Erdogan’s presidential gambit.
Shortly after the Kurdish party surged in the polls to cost the AKP its 13-year single-party rule, the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army resumed in one of the deadliest confrontations in the recent past. More than 130 members of Turkish security services were killed. There is no credible report of the death toll on the PKK side, but Erdogan claims the number of PKK militants killed is nearly 2,000. Hundreds were killed in massive air campaign against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Washington reluctantly extended its support to Turkey’s operations against the PKK at a time when U.S. diplomats worked assiduously to get Ankara on board in the fight against the ISIS.The PKK’s approval rate in Turkey is very low, hovering around 6 percent. More than half of Turkey’s Kurds even loathe the PKK for its continued armed campaign. The Kurdish HDP party’s surge in the June elections was possible because the party – and its charismatic leader Demirtas – distanced itself from the PKK.
To garner nationalist votes and defame Demirtas as “PKK’s pawn,” the government has significantly escalated the war following the elections and the pro-government newspapers decorated their front pages with Demirtas-bashing. It was a well-calculated strategy to strip the HDP from necessary votes in upcoming elections slated for Nov. 1. If the Kurdish party fails to pass the threshold necessary to gain parliamentary seats, the AKP could regain its parliamentary majority.
PKK’s new military tactic
In the past, the PKK usually ganged up in huge numbers to attack gendarmerie posts in the rural southeast, with armed skirmishes continuing for hours. They retreated to nurse their wounds and to avoid upcoming air support for Turkish troops. With U.S. support in drone intelligence-gathering, it was hard for the PKK to attack the troops in big numbers. The new method of assault is roadside bombs, which have been nightmare in Iraq for years. With explosives buried underground, PKK militants could now blow up Turkish armored vehicles carrying soldiers, avoiding armed shootouts and escaping with minimal casualties, if any. On Sept. 6, the PKK detonated three roadside bombs in Daglica, killing 16 Turkish soldiers, the biggest attack on Turkish security forces since 2011, when at least 26 Turkish soldiers were killed in a night-long clash. A day later, a truck loaded with explosives was detonated in Igdir, killing at least 13 police officers. In the past two months, dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed in 27 separate bombing attacks. The Turkish army is unable to retaliate against these attacks within Turkey. The government declared bounty for informants tipping off PKK militants and usually responded by heavily bombing PKK camps in northern Iraq.
Is peace possible?
In any negotiations to solve a military conflict, the different sides seek to gain an upper hand so that they have more say in peace talks. In this regard, the PKK’s intention to embolden its ranks could be considered rational. It is also obvious that the Turkish authorities sought to maintain the peace process by avoiding going after the PKK; but allowing the militant group to increase its presence in southeastern Turkey is a cause for concern. The majority of the Turkish people supported the peace process, because the government promised that the PKK would bury arms as a result. Quite the opposite took place.
Because the PKK’s strength comes from constant recruitment, there is no military solution to the conflict. The youth wing of the PKK is fighting the security forces in highly dense urban areas, making it very difficult for the Turkish army to retaliate without civilian casualties. Peace talks failed because both sides had different motivations to maintain them. The government wanted to increase Erdogan’s chance for expanded presidency while the PKK sought to bolster its military presence at a time of ceasefire. Both sides must return to peace talks, with conditions that they must be held transparently with no strings attached. Support for the PKK will erode slowly if Kurds are granted necessary rights and freedoms. No rebel group could fight the establishment without a legitimate cause. The content of peace talks must be simple: PKK will commit to cease its military existence as Kurds are given their rights and freedoms.
Israel and Palestine: Is it the economy, stupid?
Yossi Mekelberg/Al Arabiya/September 23/15
In the endless debates revolving around the merits of a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, economic costs and benefits often seem to be ignored or even neglected. Moreover, fact-based debate about the nature and possible solutions to the conflict is sorely missing from many of the discussions and writings about this protracted conflict. It is therefore refreshing to see new in-depth research published by the American RAND policy think tank, addressing the economic costs of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A group of researchers led by C. Ross Anthony and Charles Ries, employing quite sophisticated research methods, demonstrate scientifically and convincingly, what one might argue should have been basic common sense for everyone involved in the conflict. Though Israel’s economy would appear to gain more in absolute terms from a two-state solution, and lose more in absolute should violence resume, in relative terms the gains and losses are way greater for the Palestinians. In short, the idea is that peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians would bring enormous economic benefits to both. Yet, after twenty-two years to this month, since the Oslo Accords were signed, economic incentives proved not to be the deciding force in pushing both sides to reach a peace agreement.
Five alternative trajectories
RAND’s research looks at five alternative trajectories for the Israeli Palestinian conflict and how they would impact Israel and Palestine’s GDP by 2024. A two-state solution would increase Israeli GDP by $123 billion vs $50 billion increase of Palestinian GDP over ten years.
On the other extreme scale of scenarios, the one of returning to full-blown violence, both economies would suffer immensely, with a decrease of 46 percent in GDP per-capita in the West Bank and Gaza, and 10 percent in Israel by 2024.
Other alternative options, such as coordinated or uncoordinated unilateral withdrawal, and nonviolent resistance, have a less profound impact on both economies. Though Israel would appear to gain more in absolute terms from a two-state solution, and lose more in absolute should violence resume, in relative terms the gains and losses are way greater for the Palestinians.
Power asymmetry
This is not surprising, considering the power asymmetry between the two protagonists. Consequently it skews the role economics can play in bringing peace. The Palestinians recognise it as a source of vulnerability and would not like to be blackmailed over this; in the Israeli mind it is a bonus and not of vital interest. This explains to an extent why the economic factor is not a deciding, or even highly prioritised, aspect for the decision makers on both sides. The Israeli economy, with all its difficulties and inequalities, is doing quite well. For Israel’s current decision makers the potential economic gain, even on the scale suggested by this research, does not justify the territorial concessions required for a two-state solution and definitely not the security implications of an independent Palestinian state. The leader of one of the main partners in the current Israeli coalition government, Naftali Bennett, said in the past that a Palestinian state will destroy the Israeli economy. His lopsided logic argues that a Palestinian state will become a safe haven for anti-Israeli militancy, which will interrupt normal life in Israel. He ignores the fact that in the period before the outbreak of the Second Intifada both economies enjoyed economic growth, especially the Palestinian one which experienced unprecedented economic prosperity. It was in fact a lack of political solution, which led to violence and the Second Intifada. For the Palestinians the lure of improving economic conditions is very tempting. Yet, it would be naïve to suggest that the Palestinians would abandon a just and fair resolution to issues such as borders, territory, refugees or Jerusalem in return for economic benefits.
Economics of two-state solution
The economic rational for a two-state solution is evident both in the experience of the 1990s, and from research such as that presented by the Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Nevertheless, to make it count as a major aspect of a peace process there is a need for leadership, which sees economic development not only as an added value for a peace process, but as one of its major pillars. It could be utilised as a tool to mobilise the popular support for difficult concessions on both sides, as well as an essential source for sustaining peaceful relations between both peoples in the long-run. In addition, donor countries and international investors can positively contribute by sending a unified and coherent message, that a genuine peace between the Israelis and Palestinians will bring economic benefits for everyone – not only for corrupt elites. This could encourage grassroot, bottom-up pressure to resume the peace negotiations.
Politics of fear
Tragically, the opportunity to improve the standard of living and human development is sacrificed for those intangible aspects of the conflict beyond the remit of RAND’s research. For instance, the politics of fear and distrust have increased throughout the peace process. Violence, bloodshed and destruction make both sides disillusioned with each other and the merits of the peace process. It deepened rifts within both societies and between them. As long as the conflict is hijacked by those distrusting religious-nationalists, who see security through the narrowest of prisms, it is hard to see how a more fact-based rational discourse can emerge. Religious-nationalism mixed with security perceptions has provided the justification for embarking on the Jewish settlements project in the Palestinians occupied territories – one of the major and most visible obstacles to peace. The consequences of these activities are reflected on the Palestinian side with the emergence of the Hamas and their original demand for an Islamic Caliphate in the entire territory of mandatory Palestine. As long as the conflict is hijacked by those distrusting religious-nationalists, who see security through the narrowest of prisms, it is hard to see how a more fact-based rational discourse can emerge. The sort of discourse that is required is one which attributes greater significance to the economy as a major component to reaching peace and maintaining it.