Germany’s Pro-Iran, Anti-Israel Foreign Policy
سورين كارن/كايتستون: سياسات ألمانيا المؤيدة لإيران والمعادية لإسرائيل وكشف لواقع الوجود القوي لحزب الله في ألمانيا
Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/August 11/2019

Germany has, in fact, been decidedly hostile to Israel in recent years… Germany continues to provide millions of euros annually to organizations that promote anti-Israel BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions) and “lawfare” campaigns, anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and violence, according to NGO Monitor.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in 2008 that Israel’s security is “non-negotiable” and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said in 2018 that he went into politics “because of Auschwitz.”

In practice, however, Germany consistently appears to prioritize its relations with Israel’s enemies.

Instex, an initiative of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, would enable European trade with Iran despite U.S. sanctions.

It would facilitate barter-based trade with Iran in products such as pharmaceuticals and foods, but Tehran has repeatedly insisted that Instex must include trade in oil for the mechanism to make economic sense.

Seven months after its formation, Instex remains non-operational, in part because Iran still does not comply with international legal standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.
Germany has been decidedly hostile to Israel in recent years.

In May 2016, Germany approved an especially disgraceful UN resolution that singled out Israel at the annual assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) as the world’s only violator of “mental, physical and environmental health.”

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has cozied up to the Iranian regime and other enemies of Israel.

A senior German diplomat appointed to head an EU barter system that would enable European companies to sidestep U.S. sanctions on Iran stepped down after giving an interview in which he criticized the existence of Israel and praised Tehran’s ballistic missile program.

The episode — the latest of a series of occurrences that have laid bare the anti-Israel foundation of Germany’s foreign policy — is an embarrassing setback for the German government and will complicate its efforts to salvage the Iran nuclear deal.

Bernd Erbel, a 71-year-old former German ambassador to Iraq and Iran, said that he would not assume leadership of Instex, a payment mechanism to facilitate European business with Iran, after the newspaper Bild, on August 8, published the contents of an extensive interview Erbel gave to Ken Jebsen, a German-Iranian radio host who has been described as a “conspiracy theorist” and an “anti-Semite.”

In the 2.5-hour interview, Erbel said that Israel was founded “at the expense of another people” and claimed that “the Palestinians are the victims of our victims.” He added that “had the Jewish state been founded in Prussia, then the Palestinian problem would not have existed.”

Erbel claimed that the Jewish state is “more than ever a foreign body in the region” and that for “psychological” reasons Israel is incapable of empathy.

In the interview, Erbel defended Iran and said that “the last time Iranian troops crossed the border to another country for purposes of aggression” was in the 18th century, when Iran invaded India.

Bild noted: “That Iranian troops have been at war in Iraq since 2003, and since 2011 in Syria, supporting the Houthi militia in Yemen and Gaza, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Harakat al-Sabireen, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards together with Hezbollah in southern Syria with rockets targeted at Israel — all these offensive military actions by Iranian troops abroad are kept secret by Erbel.”

Erbel praised the successes of the Iran-backed Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War: “There was an incredible amount of enthusiasm in several Arab countries that for the first time Israel was really being challenged. That was something very, very unusual, but it was hugely important, psychologically, to see, there are forces that successfully oppose Israel.

This was something that, for example, was very much celebrated in the most bourgeois circles in Egypt. So that was a novelty.”

Erbel also defended Iran’s ballistic missile program: “By 2015, there was a UNSC resolution banning Iran from testing ballistic missiles.

After the nuclear agreement, this resolution was changed and only requests that Iran avoid such tests if the rockets can be equipped with nuclear warheads.

The request can be obeyed or not obeyed, it depends on the framework conditions, and the conditions for Iran have considerably deteriorated since the conclusion of the nuclear agreement.”

After the Bild report, a spokesperson for the German foreign ministry said that Erbel would not be assuming leadership of Instex for “personal reasons.” The spokesperson added that the foreign ministry had “no knowledge” of Erbel’s interviews and that his views were personal and do not represent the government’s position.

Germany has, in fact, been decidedly hostile to Israel in recent years. In 2018, for instance, of 21 anti-Israel UN resolutions, Germany approved 16 and abstained on four others. In May 2016, Germany approved an especially disgraceful UN resolution, co-sponsored by the Arab group of states and the Palestinian delegation, that singled out Israel at the annual assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) as the world’s only violator of “mental, physical and environmental health.”

Indeed, much of Germany’s political establishment appears to be fundamentally anti-Israel. In March 2019, for instance, Germany’s Bundestag overwhelmingly rejected a resolution by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to urge Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government to reverse its anti-Israel voting record at the United Nations.

By a vote of 408 to 155 with 65 abstentions, the Bundestag rejected the FPD’s call for the government to “clearly distance itself from unilateral, primarily politically motivated initiatives and alliances of anti-Israeli UN member states and to protect Israel and Israel’s legitimate interests from unilateral condemnation.”

In June 2019, the Bundestag rejected a non-binding resolution to outlaw the Iranian proxy Hezbollah. The bill, sponsored by the conservative party Alternative for Germany (AfD), was rejected by all of Germany’s mainstream parties.

The author of the resolution, AfD MP Beatrix von Storch, said: “Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. The Berlin government claims you must distinguish between a legitimate, political wing of Hezbollah and a terrorist wing. This does not make sense to us, or the voters,”Hezbollah’s goal is the destruction of Israel and the Jews, and we should not be offering a safe haven for them to hide in Germany and finance their armed struggle in Lebanon against Israel from our territory.”

Hezbollah’s “military” wing was outlawed in Germany in 2013, but its “political” wing is allowed to raise funds in the country. Some countries, including Israel, Britain, the United States and several Sunni Arab states, see no distinction between the military and civilian wings of Hezbollah and have accused the group of destabilizing the Middle East.

Hezbollah is believed to have more than 1,000 operatives in Germany, according to Germany’s BfV domestic intelligence agency. Nevertheless, Germany will not declare the Hezbollah movement a terrorist organization because, according to Foreign Ministry official Niels Annen, “we focus on dialogue.”

In February 2019, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier congratulated, “also in the name of my compatriots,” the Iranian regime on the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution that seeks Israel’s destruction. The move, defended by much of the German establishment as “diplomatic custom,” provoked outrage among some members of the German public.

Using the hashtag, “Not in my name,” Islamism researcher Ahmad Mansour tweeted: “Did not the same Steinmeier refuse to congratulate Trump? Why is he setting different standards for Iran? Iran is the world champion of exporting anti-Semitism, is actively involved in the killings of Jews, thousands in Syria, homosexuals in their own country.”

Josef Schuster, President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, noted: “Regarding the German president’s congratulatory telegram on the anniversary of the Iranian revolution, routine diplomacy seems to have supplanted critical thinking…. If there was a need to congratulate on this anniversary, the president could at least have found clear words of criticism of the regime.”

Steinmeier has cozied-up to Israel’s enemies before. In January 2006, as German foreign minister, he encouraged a Hamas-led government in Gaza. In July 2008, he presided over a conference in Berlin that called for the destruction of Israel.

In December 2016, Steinmeier endorsed a UN Resolution calling on Israel to “immediately and completely” stop all settlement activities “in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.” The resolution stated that the UN would accept “no changes” to the ceasefire lines of June 4, 1967, “inclusive of Jerusalem.”

In May 2017, during Steinmeier’s first visit to the Jewish state as German president, he publicly rebuked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and later laid a ceremonial wreath on the grave of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Israel’s arch-enemy.

In September 2018, after months of effort, U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell succeeded in pressuring Germany to prevent Iran from withdrawing 300 million euros ($340 million) in cash from bank accounts in Germany to offset the effect of U.S. sanctions. “Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism” Grenell said. “We must be vigilant.”

Meanwhile, Germany continues to provide millions of euros annually to organizations that promote anti-Israel BDS (boycott, divestment and sanctions) and “lawfare” campaigns, anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and violence, according to NGO Monitor.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in 2008 that Israel’s security is “non-negotiable” and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said in 2018 that he went into politics “because of Auschwitz.”

In practice, however, Germany consistently appears to prioritize its relations with Israel’s enemies.

Instex (Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges) was established on January 31, 2019 by Germany, France and the United Kingdom to salvage the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, after the United States pulled out of the agreement and reimposed sanctions on Tehran. U.S. President Donald J. Trump, criticizing the nuclear deal, pointed out that “within a very short number of years, they would be able to make nuclear weapons.”

Instex, an initiative of German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, would enable European trade with Iran despite U.S. sanctions.

It would facilitate barter-based trade with Iran in products such as pharmaceuticals and foods, but Tehran has repeatedly insisted that Instex must include trade in oil for the mechanism to make economic sense.

Seven months after its formation, Instex remains non-operational, in part because Iran still does not comply with international legal standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.

*Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute.

© 2019 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14699/germany-iran-israel

The post سورين كارن/كايتستون: سياسات ألمانيا المؤيدة لإيران والمعادية لإسرائيل وكشف لواقع الوجود القوي لحزب الله في ألمانيا/Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute: Germany’s Pro-Iran, Anti-Israel Foreign Policy appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

فيديو وبالصوت/مقابلة كيانية وإيمانية بإمتياز من تلفزيون OTV مع الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة تتناول بعمق تاريخي وإنجيلي فلسفة وأهمية النظام اللبناني الطوائفي في تأمين استمرارية تعايش أقليات شرق أوسطية اثنية ومذهبية وثقافية قمعت واضطهدت في مواطنها الأساسية فلجأت إلى لبنان

11 آب/2019

بالصوت/فورمات/WMA/مقابلة كيانية وإيمانية بإمتياز من تلفزيون OTV مع الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة/11 آب/2019/اضغط هنا للإستماع للمقابلة

بالصوت/فورماتMP3/مقابلة كيانية وإيمانية بإمتياز من تلفزيون OTV مع الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة/11 آب/2019/اضغط على العلامة في أسفل إلى يمين الصفحة للإستماع للمقابلة
بالصوت/فورماتMP3/مقابلة كيانية وإيمانية بإمتياز من تلفزيون OTV مع الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة/11 آب/2019/

أهم المواضيع والعناوين التي تناولها وشرحها وتطرق لها وفندها وفضحها وأكد أهميتها أو رفضها الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة
تفريخ وتلخيص وصياغة الياس بجاني بحرية وتصرف كاملين ودن أي مسؤولية لصاحب المقابلة
11 آب/2019

*شرح لخلفيات الأزمات التي يعاني لبنان منها في الوقت الراهن

*ضرورة فهم المسيحي إلى أمر إيماني مهم جداً وهو أن الكنيسة لا تقوم على وحدة الشكل..مفهومنا المسيحي لله مبني على الأقانيم الثلاثة.الآب والإبن والروح القدس.

*فلسفة النظام اللبناني التنوعي والتعايشي الذي يشارك كل مكوناته المذهبية ال 19 في القرار والحكم والمواقع والمسؤولية والمصير.

*شرح لتاريخ لبنان ولدوره الحضاري وأهميته ماضياً وحاضراً ومستقبلاً.

*شرح لمفهوم لبنان القداسة والإرادة الألهية التي وراء غرزه وتجزره في التاريخ.

*شرح لمفهوم التعايش الثقافي والحضاري الذي لبنان هو موطنه ورمزه ومثاله وأمثولته البهية.

*تعداد للأسباب التي تؤكد عملياً لماذا لبنان ليس بلد صدفة تاريخياً وإيمانياً وثقافة وحضارة كما يدعي البعص من السطحيين والقشريين.

*شرح لمفهوم وأهمية التنوع والإختلاف الذي يجسده ورغم كل الصعاب نظام لبنان الطائفي.

*تأكيد على ضرورة أخد العبر من قيامة المسيحيين في لبنان بعد المجازر التي ارتكبها المماليك ضدهم في القرن الرابع عشر.

*التحذير من خطورة ما يسمى صهر وطني. الصهر لا علاقة له بالبشر وينطبق فقط على المعادن.

*ضرورة وأهمية محافظة كل شريحة لبنانية مجتمعية واثنية ومذهبية على تاريخها وذاكرتها وتفردها وخصوصياتها.

*ضرورة الفهم لأهمية النظام اللبناني الذي هو عملياً أرقى نظام في العالم لتعايش وسلامة وحرية الأقليات حيث التنوع الديني والمذهبي والإثني.

*تعرية وفضح ونصح للذين ينتقدون ويسفهون النظام اللبناني الطائفي الذين هم جهلة وقشريون في تفكيرهم.

*التأكيد على حقيقة معيشية وحياتية مهمة وهي أن لا علاقة لمشاكل لبنان الحالية كافة بطبيعة وفلسفة نظامة الطوائفي الحضاري والراقي ولكن العلل كافة تكمن في مذلة وخطيئة الفساد.

*التنبيه إلى أن حرية الرأي لا علاقة لها في التهجم على الآخر وبمساعي تحطيمه بالكلمة والإعتداء على معتقده وإيمانه. حرية الإنسان لها حدود ووحريته هذه تنتهي حيث تبدأ حرية الآخرين. مهاجمة المسيحية أو غيرها من الأديان وعلى الرموز الدينية هي خارج أطر الحرية ولا علاقة للحرية بها.

*أهمية فهم الكلمة التي هي يسوع الذي تجسد وأصبح الكلمة.

*مفهوم الكلمة التي هي يسوع والحوار بالكلمة.

*تحذير من اخطر السرطانيات الفكرية والممارساتية اللبنانية التي تكمن في عدم فهم المواطن اللبناني لأهمية ما هو عام أي للدولة، أي ما هو ملك لكل المواطنين، أي الشأن العام، وما بين ما هو خاص أي ما هو للأفراد، أي الشأن الخاص.

*شرح لحقيقة وواقع ثقافة وممارسات المواطن اللبناني الذي أبدع في الشأن الخاص وأجرم بحق كل ما هو شأن عام وهنا تمكن العلل السرطانية.

*ضرورة الإيمان المطلق ودون يأس أو إحباط بأن لبنان المذكور في الإنجيل المقدس 70 مرة بكل ما هو رمز للمجد والعزة والجمال والحياة والقوة، هذا اللبناننعم يهتز ولكنه لا يسقط واستمراريته هي ليست بإرادة بشرية، بل بإرادة إلهية ومقدسة.

*الاختلاف حق مقدس ونحن المسيحيين في لبنان نعيشه مع المسلم منذ القرن السابع عشر. النظام اللبناني التعايشي ألغى مفهوم التسامح بين الشرائح المختلفة وبين القوي والضعيف وبين الأقليات والأكثريات..ألغاه واستبدله بمفهوم مهم جداً وحضاري بإمتياز هو قبول الأخر بمساواة واحترام.

*إلغاء الإختلاف موت ويتعارض مع القداسة ومع تكوين الطبيعة لأن التنوع هو موجود في تكوين الإنسان وفي كل شيء على الأرض.

*العراق تبنى مفهوم النظام اللبناني لأنه أهم نظام في العالم للتعايش وولمبدأ قبول الآخر ورفض انصهاره، اي تذويبه بالقوة فكرياً وثقافة وتاريخاً وحضارة وإيماناً ومعتقداً.

The post فيديو وبالصوت/مقابلة كيانية وإيمانية بإمتياز مع الأب البروفيسور جورج حبيقة تتناول بعمق تاريخي وإنجيلي فلسفة وأهمية النظام اللبناني الطوائفي في تأمين استمرارية تعايش أقليات شرق أوسطية اثنية ومذهبية وثقافية قمعت واضطهدت في مواطنها الأساسية فلجأت إلىى لبنان appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

في موضوعُ عملِ الفِلسطينيين في لبنان: ضَعوا أنفسَكم في مكانَ لبنان واحكُموا
سجعان قزي/الشرق الأوسط/11 آب/2019

في لبنان يأخذُ موضوعُ عملِ الأجانب عموماً، والفِلسطينيين والسوريين خصوصاً، أبعاداً سياسيّة وطائفيّة ومذهبيّة لعِدّة أسبابٍ أبرزُها:

1) طبيعة تكوينِ الكيانِ اللبناني المرتكِزِ على التوازنِ الطائفيّ.

2) خطورة الأزمة الاقتصاديّة التي أَضعفَت النموَّ وعَقَّرت فرصَ العمل، فارتفعت نسبة البطالة إلى 35% في صفوفِ الشباب، والمديونيّة إلى 90 مليار دولار، وعددُ اللبنانيين غيرُ المضمونين إلى 70%، والّذين يعيشون تحتَ سقفِ الفَقر إلى 1.280.000 لبنانيٍّ.

3) اجتياحُ النازحين السوريين سوقَ العملِ اللبناني حيث ناهز عددُ العامِلين منهم بشكلٍ غيرِ شرعي الـ800 ألف عامل.

4) خوفُ اللبنانيين من أن يؤدّي عملُ اللاجئين الفلسطينيين إلى اندماجِهم في لبنانَ فتوطينِهم.

استقرَّ عددُ اللاجئين الفِلسطينيين في لبنان على نحوِ نِصف مليون لاجئٍ، بينما تخطّى عددُ النازحين السوريين المليون ونصفَ المليون نازح. وما يُقلق اللبنانيين، أنَّ هذه الاستضافة طالت: الفِلسطينيّون هنا منذ سبعينَ سنة، والسوريّون منذ تسعِ سنوات. ولا شيءَ يُشير في المدى المنظورِ إلى احتمالِ عودة الفِلسطينيين إلى فلسطين والسوريين إلى سوريا. «اتفاقاتُ أوسلو» والحلُّ على أساسِ الدولتَين و«صفقة القرن» سلبت الشعبَ الفِلسطيني الـمُشتَّت «حقَّ العودة». والمجتمعُ الدولي يرفض عودة النازحين السوريين قبل التسوية السياسيّة للحرب، وهيهات أن تأتيَ، والنظامُ السوريُّ، الذي خاض حرباً مذهبيّة الهوّية، لا يَقبل إلا بعودة «سُنِّيي النظام».

قبلَ نكبة فِلسطين كان آلافُ الفِلسطينيين يعملون في لبنانَ، وقد نَجحوا واندَمجوا وتَجنّسوا، ونحن فخورون بهم.

وقبلَ الحربِ في سوريا كان المواطنون السوريّون يَشتغلون في قطاعاتِ البناءِ والزراعة والبيئة ويعيشون في المجتمعِ اللبناني من دون أي إشكالية.

لكن ما يُطلب اليومَ من لبنان ليس السماح بالعملِ لأفرادٍ فِلسطينيين وسوريين، بل للشعبين الفِلسطيني والسوريّ، فيما الاقتصادُ اللبناني عاجزٌ عن إيجادِ عملٍ لأفرادٍ لبنانيين.
أي عقلٍ يُبرِّرُ هذا المنطِق؟ وأي أدبيّاتٍ تُجيز هذا المطلَب؟

رغم ذلك، يرعى القانونُ اللبناني عملَ الفلسطينيين ويُراعيهم.

فالدولة اللبنانيّة خَصَّت اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بإجراءاتٍ مميزَّة عن سائر الأجانبِ تسمحُ لهم بالعملِ وإن كانت حَصَرت مهناً معيّنة بمواطنيها اللبنانيين أُسوة بما يجري في كلِّ بلدانِ العالم.

من هنا، إنَّ الاحتجاجاتِ الفلسطينيّة الأخيرة كانت غيرَ مبرَّرة لأنّها صَوّرت لبنان كأنه دولة تكافح الفِلسطينيين بينما الواقعُ هو عكسُ ذلك.

وحين كنت وزيراً للعمل بين سنتي 2014 و2016 أعطيت الفِلسطينيين تسهيلاتٍ من دون الإساءة إلى حقوقِ اللبنانيين.

لكن إذا كان الفِلسطينيّون، تحت ذريعة أنّهم لاجئون، يريدون أنْ ينافسوا اللبنانيين على فرصِ العمل، فالأمرُ، بصراحة، مرفوض. شاءَ من شاءْ، وأبى من أبى.

منذ سنة 2006، تاريخِ الحربِ بين إسرائيل و«حزب الله»، وسوقُ العملِ اللبناني لا يَفرِزُ سنوياً سوى 3500 فرصة عملٍ، بينما المتخرِّجون سنوياً في المعاهدِ المهنيّة والجامعات يَبلغون 47 ألفَ لبنانيِّ. أي أنَّ لبنان أمام عجزٍ سنوي يُناهز 33500 فرصة عمل. فمن أين سيأتي بفُرصِ العمل لغيرِ بنيه أكانوا فِلسطينيين أم سوريين؟

مطلعَ سنة 2019 ارتفَعت نسبة البطالة في «كانتون» جنيف، عاصمة سويسرا، من 4.1% إلى 4.4% فقط، فسارعَ مجلسُ المدينة وقَرّر إعطاءَ الأولويّة في العملِ لمواطني جنيف على سائرِ مواطني سويسرا. فما بالنُا في لبنان ونُسبة البطالة ارتفعت إلى 35% من القوى العاملة؟ لمن نعطي الأولوية؟ رجاءً، ضَعوا أنفسَكم مكاننا وأعْطوا الجواب.

قبل حقوقِ اللبنانيين وغيرِهم في دولِ الخليج هناك حقوقُ الخليجيين.
وقبلَ حقوقِ الفِلسطينيين والسوريين في لبنان هناك حقوقُ اللبنانيين.
هذه مبادئُ دوليّة تنسجِم مع شِرعة حقوقِ الإنسان والقوانينِ الدوليّة.

رُبَّ قائلٍ: لماذا أنتم في لبنان لا توظّفون غرباءَ فيما المهاجِرون اللبنانيّون يعملون في جميعِ دولِ العالم، وبخاصة في دول الخليج؟
الجوابُ هو التالي:)
1-ليس صحيحاً أنَّ لبنانَ يمنع الغرباءَ من العمل، فعددُ العربِ والأجانب، العاملين شرعياً في لبنان يفوق الـ400 ألفِ شخصٍ، أي 22% من نسبة اليدِ العاملة اللبنانيّة.)

2-إنَّ اللبنانيين هاجروا كأفرادٍ ووَجدوا عملاً كأفرادٍ، بالحسنى لا بالقوّة، ولم يَنتزعوا فرصَ العمل ِمن مواطني الدولِ التي يَعملون فيها.)

3-إنَّ هؤلاءِ اللبنانيين تَطلُبهم البلدانُ المضيفة ليعملوا في مجالاتٍ تحتاجُ إليهم فيها وليسهموا في نموِّها وتقدّمِها. 4) اللبنانيّون الّذين يعملون في الدولِ العربيّة والأجنبيّة ليسوا مجنَّدين في فصائلَ عسكريّة وتنظيماتٍ متطرِّفة، ولم يُنشئوا دويلاتٍ داخلَ الدولِ المضيفة. 5) إنَّ دولاً خليجيّة عزيزة حين طردت بعضَ اللبنانيين لمجرَّدِ أن اشتَبهَت في علاقاتِهم مع حزب لبناني معيَّن، لم يَتداعَ اللبنانيّون هناك إلى تنظيمِ مظاهرات في هذه الدولِ الشقيقة.

يبقى أنَّ الفلسطينيين في لبنان لا يستطيعون البقاءَ من دون عملٍ وحقوقٍ اجتماعيّة ومدنيّة؛ فما العمل؟

الحلُّ ليس في لبنان. إنّه في عودة اللاجئين إلى فِلسطين، لكن أين هم من هذه العودة المستحيلة؟ أو في إعادة انتشارِهم على بلدانٍ قادرة أن تؤمّنَ لهم حياة كريمة وعملاً مُستداماً.

في هذا السياقِ، يَتحتّمُ على دولة لبنان بَدءُ مفاوضاتٍ مع دولٍ عربيّة وأجنبيّة لاستضافة اللاجئين الفِلسطينيين.

وعلى سبيل المثال: مساحة العالم العربي 13.3 مليون كلم مربع ونسبة السكّانِ في الكيلومتر المربع 54 مواطناً عربياً.

أما في لبنان، فنسبة السكّان في الكيلومتر المربع 574 مواطناً (ومع الفِلسطينيين والسوريين تُصبح 841 ساكناً في الكيلومتر المربع)، ومساحة لبنان لا تتعدى الـ10452 كيلومتراً مربعاً، أي أنَّ العالم العربي هو أكبرُ من لبنان بـ1272 مرّة.
من هنا يبدأ الحلّ.

*سجعان قزي هو وزير عمل لبناني سابق

The post سجعان قزي/الشرق الأوسط: في موضوعُ عملِ الفِلسطينيين في لبنان: ضَعوا أنفسَكم في مكانَ لبنان واحكُموا appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 12/2019

The post Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 12/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 12 آب/2019

اضغط هنا لقراءة نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة المفصلة، اللبنانية والعربية ليوم 12 آب/2019

ارشيف نشرات أخبار موقعنا اليومية/عربية وانكليزية منذ العام 2006/اضغط هنا لدخول صفحة الأرشيف

عناوين أقسام نشرة المنسقية باللغة العربية
الزوادة الإيمانية لليوم
تعليقات الياس بجاني وخلفياتها
الأخبار اللبنانية
المتفرقات اللبنانية
الأخبار الإقليمية والدولية
المقالات والتعليقات والتحاليل السياسية الشاملة
المؤتمرات والندوات والبيانات والمقابلات والمناسبات الخاصة والردود وغيره

The post نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 12 آب/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

قالَ الرَبُّ يَسوعُ لِتلاميذِهِ: «لا تَظُنُّوا أَنِّي جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ عَلى الأَرْضِ سَلامًا، مَا جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ سَلامًا بَلْ سَيْفًا
إنجيل القدّيس متّى10/من34حتى39/:”قالَ الرَبُّ يَسوعُ لِتلاميذِهِ: «لا تَظُنُّوا أَنِّي جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ عَلى الأَرْضِ سَلامًا، مَا جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ سَلامًا بَلْ سَيْفًا. جِئْتُ لأُفَرِّقَ بَيْنَ الرَّجُلِ وَأَبِيْه، والبِنْتِ وأُمِّهَا، والكَنَّةِ وحَمَاتِهَا. وأَعْدَاءُ الإِنْسَانِ أَهْلُ بَيْتِهِ. مَنْ أَحَبَّ أَبًا أَو أُمًّا أَكْثَرَ مِنِّي فَلا يَسْتَحِقُّني. ومَنْ أَحَبَّ ٱبْنًا أَوِ ٱبْنَةً أَكْثَرَ مِنِّي فَلا يَسْتَحِقُّنِي. ومَنْ لا يَحْمِلُ صَلِيبَهُ ويَتْبَعُنِي فَلا يَسْتَحِقُّنِي. مَنْ وَجَدَ نَفْسَهُ يَفْقِدُهَا، ومَنْ فَقَدَ نَفْسَهُ مِنْ أَجْلِي يَجِدُهَا.”

Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 10/34-39:”‘Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and one’s foes will be members of one’s own household. Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and whoever loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and whoever does not take up the cross and follow me is not worthy of me. Those who find their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it.”

ٱلرُّوحُ ٱلقُدُسُ على جَمِيعِ ٱلَّذينَ سَمِعُوا ٱلكَلِمَة. فَدَهِشَ كُلُّ ٱلْمُؤْمِنينَ ٱلْمَختُونِين، ٱلَّذينَ رافَقُوا بُطرُس
سفر أعمال الرسل10/من44حتى48/:”يا إِخْوَتِي، فِيمَا كَانَ بُطرُسُ لا يَزَالُ يتَكَلَّمُ بِتِلْكَ ٱلأَقْوَال، نَزَلَ ٱلرُّوحُ ٱلقُدُسُ على جَمِيعِ ٱلَّذينَ سَمِعُوا ٱلكَلِمَة. فَدَهِشَ كُلُّ ٱلْمُؤْمِنينَ ٱلْمَختُونِين، ٱلَّذينَ رافَقُوا بُطرُس، لأَنَّ مَوهِبَةَ ٱلرُّوحِ ٱلقُدُسِ أُفيضَتْ حتَّى عَلى ٱلأُمَم؛ لأَنَّهُم كَانُوا يَسْمَعُونَهُم يَتَكَلَّمُونَ بلُغَات، ويُعَظِّمُونَ ٱلله. حِينَئِذٍ أَجَابَ بُطرُس: هَلْ يَستَطيعُ أَحَدٌ أَنْ يَمْنَعَ مَاءَ ٱلعِمَادِ عَنْ هؤُلاءِ ٱلنَّاس، وقَدْ نَالُوا مِثْلَنا ٱلرُّوحَ ٱلقُدُس؟. وأَمَرَهُم أَنْ يَعْتَمِدُوا بِٱسْمِ يَسُوعَ ٱلْمَسِيح. حِينَئِذٍ سأَلُوهُ أَنْ يُقِيمَ عِنْدَهُم أَيَّامًا.”

The Holy Spirit fell upon all who heard the word. The circumcised believers who had come with Peter were astounded
Acts of the Apostles 10/44-48:”While Peter was still speaking, the Holy Spirit fell upon all who heard the word. The circumcised believers who had come with Peter were astounded that the gift of the Holy Spirit had been poured out even on the Gentiles, for they heard them speaking in tongues and extolling God. Then Peter said, ‘Can anyone withhold the water for baptizing these people who have received the Holy Spirit just as we have?’ So he ordered them to be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ. Then they invited him to stay for several days.”

The post قالَ الرَبُّ يَسوعُ لِتلاميذِهِ: «لا تَظُنُّوا أَنِّي جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ عَلى الأَرْضِ سَلامًا، مَا جِئْتُ لأُلْقِيَ سَلامًا بَلْ سَيْفًا/Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Iran hopes a US election will solve its Trump problem
د.مجيد رافيزادا: يتمنى ملالي إيران أن تحل الإنتخابات الرئاسية الأميركية مشكلتهم مع ترامب
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/August 12/2019

One of the characteristics of democracies in the West is that every government or administration generally comes to office for a few years, and is then replaced by another with new plans and policies.

One of the strategic advantages Iran has over the West is that, without such democratic accountability, the theocratic establishment can plan decades ahead.

It is true that presidents in Iran change every four or eight years, but they do not make final decisions.

Presidents and foreign ministers work for the Supreme Leader, the ultimate political and religious authority, who rules until his death and enjoys the final say in domestic and foreign policies.

This continuity has given Iran a platform for a multifaceted strategy in an attempt to wait out the Trump administration.

When Donald Trump became US president, Iranian leaders knew they would have several difficult years ahead; Trump had made his intention of confronting the Iranian regime crystal clear.

At the same time, because Trump did not win the popular vote, Iran’s leaders guessed that they would have to survive only four years of his administration.

Pitting Europe against the US paid off for Iran as the EU fell into its divide-and-conquer political trap.

The EU also worked hard on avenues that can preserve the nuclear deal, and continues to do so.

Trump began by withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 deal with world powers to curb Iran’s nuclear program in return for an end to sanctions.

When the US re-imposed those sanctions, Iran did not immediately respond by also pulling out of the nuclear deal, for three main reasons.

First, a swift withdrawal could have tilted the European Union toward the US position and intensified the pressure on Tehran. Instead, Iran played the victim by saying it would stick to the agreement in spite of the US having pulled out.

Since the US was to blame, the international community should reimburse Iran’s financial losses, it argued.

Pitting Europe against the US paid off for Iran as the EU fell into its divide-and-conquer political trap. The EU also worked hard on avenues that can preserve the nuclear deal, and continues to do so.

To circumvent US sanctions that bar access to the dollar, Germany, France and the UK set up a new mechanism called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX).

Second, by not swiftly and openly withdrawing from the nuclear deal, Tehran was also attempting to prevent the crisis from spiraling into military confrontation with the US.

From Iran’s perspective, some of Trump’s officials — such as national security adviser John Bolton — would not hesitate to confront Iran militarily; and such a war would be the end of the clerical regime, because Iran’s military capabilities are much inferior to those of the US.

Third, by claiming that Iran is still adhering to the terms of the nuclear deal, Tehran is encouraging the next Democrat president to rejoin the JCPOA and lift all the sanctions imposed by Trump. That is why, despite openly breaching the JCPOA’s limits on enriched uranium, Iran argues that these are remedial measures in response to US actions, and are both permissible and reversible.

In tandem with this strategy, the regime also deployed more hard power in the Gulf while simultaneously warning that to confront them would be a catastrophe for the world. According to President Hassan Rouhani: “Peace with Iran is the mother of peace.

War with Iran is the mother of all war.” Their belief that the EU is on Iran’s side and that the US is alone has emboldened Iran’s leaders to implement such aggressive polices.

US presidential elections take place next year, and Iran’s leaders believe their wait will soon be over. We shall see.

*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. He serves on the boards of the Harvard International Review, the Harvard International Relations Council and the US-Middle East Chamber for Commerce and Business. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh

The post د.مجيد رافيزادا: يتمنى ملالي إيران أن تحل الإنتخابات الرئاسية الأميركية مشكلتهم مع ترامب/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh: Iran hopes a US election will solve its Trump problem appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

The Trump Administration Is Tackling One of the World’s Most Dangerous Border Disputes
دراسة موسعة للأستاذ الجامعي روبرت رابيل تتناول دور الوساطة الأميركية بين لبنان وإسرائيل لحل المشاكل الحدود البرية والبحرية بينهما بهدف البدأ بالإستفادة من مخزوني الغاز والبترول
Robert G. Rabil/The National Interest/August 12/2019

If Jerusalem and Beirut were to reach an agreement on the demarcation of their borders, then that would be a significant foreign-policy achievement.

AS THE Trump administration presses Arab countries to sign off on President Donald Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian “deal of the century” amid growing Arab polarization and vocal pessimism, little attention has been given to another sensitive regional matter that the administration has been aptly and quietly tackling.

This matter revolves around the demarcation of the Lebanon-Israel maritime and land borders, which have been the focal point of skirmishes, a devastating war in 2006, and rising regional tension involving Iran and Israel.

Since last year, the Trump administration has been pursuing quiet shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Jerusalem to demarcate their borders, while at the same time pursuing a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran and Hezbollah. The accomplishments achieved thus far because of the administration’s efforts, led by acting Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield, have been quite impressive.

Even if their success is incomplete, these efforts could help the economies of both Lebanon and Israel. More importantly, it could decrease the risk of a devastating war with regional repercussions.

Satterfield has extracted some essential concessions from both sides. The negotiations over Israel-Lebanon’s borders are highly sensitive because they involve the exploration of energy in disputed maritime Mediterranean waters and a dispute over land borders, the latter of which has been the focus of armed conflicts and a focal point of national and regional conflicts.

THE DISCOVERY of enormous oil and gas reserves in the Mediterranean has been auspicious for the economies of both Israel and Lebanon. The former is already producing gas from several gas fields, including Tamar and Dalit, and is preparing to produce gas from the Leviathan gas field, operated by the energy giant Noble Energy.

Additionally, Israel is expanding its offshore exploration efforts via a second bid round, hoping to attract investment via exploration licenses in the country’s waters in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Israel and Cyprus have signed agreements delineating their maritime borders and are embracing further economic cooperation with assistance from Noble Energy.

The eagerness with which Israel would like to produce gas from these fields, especially Leviathan, and press ahead with its economic cooperation with Cyprus (with Greece to follow), is hedged by concerns about possible armed conflicts with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, due to disputes over the boundaries of these two countries’ exclusive economic zones.

Lebanon and Israel both claim an area that is approximately 860 square kilometers in size. In fact, in 2011, the Obama administration’s special Middle East envoy, Frederic Hof, proposed what came to be known as the “Hof Line,” whereby Lebanon would have 550 square kilometers of the disputed area and Israel would take the rest. Lebanon rejected the proposal. In fact, last year Lebanon notably signed off on contracts with giants Total, Eni and Novatek to explore energy in its exclusive economic zone—including in a block disputed by Israel.

Total expressed its awareness of the dispute and stated it will drill away from the disputed area, which consists of less than 8 percent of the block under its contract.

While the maritime border dispute may sound convoluted, it pales before the dispute over land borders. At the heart of this land border dispute are three areas: Shebaa Farms, Kfar Shouba Hills and Ghajar. The situation is complex and multi-faceted: there are disputes over the Lebanon-Israel border, the Israel-Syria border and Lebanon-Syria border.

Additionally, there are inconsistencies in the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border, which can be traced to the old British and French mandates over Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Finally, the gradual evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the changes in de facto territorial ownership as a result of the conflict, adds an additional dimension of complexity to the situation.

Following twenty-two years of occupying a swath of southern Lebanon, Israel decided in 2000 to withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with un Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Yet the withdrawal created a problem over the exact location of the border, since Israel withdrew from contiguous Lebanese-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese territories.

The Lebanon-Syria border was mapped by the French in 1920, but the exact boundary has not been delineated by Lebanon or Syria since their independence. The mapping of the Israel-Lebanon border followed the 1949 armistice agreement that corresponded with the British mandatory border. As for the border between Lebanon and Syria, there was no international boundary agreement between the two of them.

As such, the un mapped the border relying on the separation lines of its troops in the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon. In his report to the un Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recognizing the lack of an international boundary agreement, recommended “to proceed on the basis of the line separating the areas of operation of unifil and undof [the un Forces in South Lebanon and the Golan Heights, respectively] along the relevant portions of the Lebanese-Syrian boundary…”

In short, following its own surveys of the region’s borders, the un simply drew the border demarcation, known as the Blue Line, and subsequently recognized the complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon as corresponding to the Blue Line. The Lebanese government and Hezbollah, with Syria’s consent, challenged the un position and declared that Israel’s withdrawal remains incomplete, since it still occupies the Lebanese Shebaa Farms.

The un, adopting Israel’s position, emphasized that Shebaa Farms—located south of the Lebanese village of Shebaa, and comprising an area of 14 km in length and 2 km in width—are part of the Syrian Golan Heights.

Conversely, Lebanese authorities asserted sovereignty over the Farms by producing land deeds, official documents that place the Farms within Lebanon and pre-1967 tax receipts related to the Farms. These receipts indicated that taxes were paid by residents of Shebaa village (and adjacent town Nukheila) to the Lebanese government. Meanwhile, in response to Lebanon’s claim that Israel’s withdrawal is incomplete, Hezbollah asserted its right to continue its muqawama (resistance) against Israel.

THE DISPUTE over the village of Ghajar, meanwhile, is the product of both the Arab-Israeli conflict and a vagueness as to where the exact border between Lebanon and Syria lies. Essentially, there are no definite maps placing the village either in Lebanon or Syria.

However, most of the Ghajar’s residents are Alawis and have been in close contact with their coreligionists in the Golan Heights, though many of them acquired Lebanese citizenship. When Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, Ghajar residents found themselves in a political no man’s land. They petitioned Israel to recognize them as residents of the Golan. Israel subsequently offered them citizenship when it formally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981. Interestingly, Ghajar residents, unlike many residents of the Golan Heights, accepted Israel’s offer. During Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, Ghajar’s residents were able to travel unimpeded between Lebanon and Israel due to their dual citizenships.

When Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 2000, Ghajar was split between Lebanon and Israel in accordance with the Blue Line, which cut across the village. As a result, the village was divided, with a majority of it formally located in Lebanon to the north, while the southern portion remained in Israel. Besides its militarily strategic position along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria tri-border, Ghajar’s boundaries scrape the Wazzani River, which is the main spring of the Hasbani River. This has led to tumultuous instances of water politics: Lebanese authorities have consistently accused Israel of trying to steal the water of the Hasbani, while Israeli authorities have been constantly worried about Lebanon diverting the waters of the Hasbani River.

During the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel took control of the whole village. unsc Resolution 1701, which ended the war, called on Israel to withdraw from the northern section of Ghajar. Israel, however, has not obliged, citing security considerations: in 2005, Hezbollah tried to kidnap Israeli soldiers stationed in the southern section of the village, and in the 2006 war, Ghajar was a fiercely contested area. The occupation of the northern section of Ghajar by Israel has thus reinforced both Lebanon’s claim that Israel’s withdrawal is not complete and Hezbollah’s right of muqawamah.

LAST BUT not least, the village of Kfar Shouba and its hills are another point of contention between Israel and Lebanon. Located in Lebanon, next to the Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights, the village commands a military strategic position due to its location overlooking northern Israel and the Bekaa Valley. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization used the village as a steppingstone to conduct sabotage activities in Israel. In response, Israel heavily shelled the village and its hills and carried out punitive military missions there. In 1972, Israel occupied the village for a short period of time.

Then, during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon (1978–2000), the Israel Defense Forces and their proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army, used the village as an important observation post. Subsequently, Israel withdrew from the village but kept occupying the hills and the lands of Kfar Shouba in proximity to Israel’s border for security reasons. In the 2006 war, most of the village’s homes were either destroyed or damaged. As was the case with Shebaa and Ghajar, Lebanon and Hezbollah have insisted on their right to resist Israel’s occupation until the hills of Kfar Shouba are retrieved.

AS THE Trump administration presses Arab countries to sign off on President Donald Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian “deal of the century” amid growing Arab polarization and vocal pessimism, little attention has been given to another sensitive regional matter that the administration has been aptly and quietly tackling. This matter revolves around the demarcation of the Lebanon-Israel maritime and land borders, which have been the focal point of skirmishes, a devastating war in 2006, and rising regional tension involving Iran and Israel.

Since last year, the Trump administration has been pursuing quiet shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Jerusalem to demarcate their borders, while at the same time pursuing a policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran and Hezbollah. The accomplishments achieved thus far because of the administration’s efforts, led by acting Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield, have been quite impressive. Even if their success is incomplete, these efforts could help the economies of both Lebanon and Israel. More importantly, it could decrease the risk of a devastating war with regional repercussions.

Satterfield has extracted some essential concessions from both sides. The negotiations over Israel-Lebanon’s borders are highly sensitive because they involve the exploration of energy in disputed maritime Mediterranean waters and a dispute over land borders, the latter of which has been the focus of armed conflicts and a focal point of national and regional conflicts.

THE DISCOVERY of enormous oil and gas reserves in the Mediterranean has been auspicious for the economies of both Israel and Lebanon. The former is already producing gas from several gas fields, including Tamar and Dalit, and is preparing to produce gas from the Leviathan gas field, operated by the energy giant Noble Energy. Additionally, Israel is expanding its offshore exploration efforts via a second bid round, hoping to attract investment via exploration licenses in the country’s waters in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Israel and Cyprus have signed agreements delineating their maritime borders and are embracing further economic cooperation with assistance from Noble Energy.

The eagerness with which Israel would like to produce gas from these fields, especially Leviathan, and press ahead with its economic cooperation with Cyprus (with Greece to follow), is hedged by concerns about possible armed conflicts with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, due to disputes over the boundaries of these two countries’ exclusive economic zones. Lebanon and Israel both claim an area that is approximately 860 square kilometers in size. In fact, in 2011, the Obama administration’s special Middle East envoy, Frederic Hof, proposed what came to be known as the “Hof Line,” whereby Lebanon would have 550 square kilometers of the disputed area and Israel would take the rest. Lebanon rejected the proposal.

In fact, last year Lebanon notably signed off on contracts with giants Total, Eni and Novatek to explore energy in its exclusive economic zone—including in a block disputed by Israel. Total expressed its awareness of the dispute and stated it will drill away from the disputed area, which consists of less than 8 percent of the block under its contract.

While the maritime border dispute may sound convoluted, it pales before the dispute over land borders. At the heart of this land border dispute are three areas: Shebaa Farms, Kfar Shouba Hills and Ghajar. The situation is complex and multi-faceted: there are disputes over the Lebanon-Israel border, the Israel-Syria border and Lebanon-Syria border. Additionally, there are inconsistencies in the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border, which can be traced to the old British and French mandates over Lebanon, Syria and Palestine.

Finally, the gradual evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the changes in de facto territorial ownership as a result of the conflict, adds an additional dimension of complexity to the situation.

Following twenty-two years of occupying a swath of southern Lebanon, Israel decided in 2000 to withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with un Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Yet the withdrawal created a problem over the exact location of the border, since Israel withdrew from contiguous Lebanese-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese territories.

The Lebanon-Syria border was mapped by the French in 1920, but the exact boundary has not been delineated by Lebanon or Syria since their independence. The mapping of the Israel-Lebanon border followed the 1949 armistice agreement that corresponded with the British mandatory border. As for the border between Lebanon and Syria, there was no international boundary agreement between the two of them.

As such, the un mapped the border relying on the separation lines of its troops in the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon. In his report to the un Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recognizing the lack of an international boundary agreement, recommended “to proceed on the basis of the line separating the areas of operation of unifil and undof [the un Forces in South Lebanon and the Golan Heights, respectively] along the relevant portions of the Lebanese-Syrian boundary…”

In short, following its own surveys of the region’s borders, the un simply drew the border demarcation, known as the Blue Line, and subsequently recognized the complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon as corresponding to the Blue Line. The Lebanese government and Hezbollah, with Syria’s consent, challenged the un position and declared that Israel’s withdrawal remains incomplete, since it still occupies the Lebanese Shebaa Farms.

The un, adopting Israel’s position, emphasized that Shebaa Farms—located south of the Lebanese village of Shebaa, and comprising an area of 14 km in length and 2 km in width—are part of the Syrian Golan Heights.

Conversely, Lebanese authorities asserted sovereignty over the Farms by producing land deeds, official documents that place the Farms within Lebanon and pre-1967 tax receipts related to the Farms. These receipts indicated that taxes were paid by residents of Shebaa village (and adjacent town Nukheila) to the Lebanese government. Meanwhile, in response to Lebanon’s claim that Israel’s withdrawal is incomplete, Hezbollah asserted its right to continue its muqawama (resistance) against Israel.

THE DISPUTE over the village of Ghajar, meanwhile, is the product of both the Arab-Israeli conflict and a vagueness as to where the exact border between Lebanon and Syria lies.

Essentially, there are no definite maps placing the village either in Lebanon or Syria. However, most of the Ghajar’s residents are Alawis and have been in close contact with their coreligionists in the Golan Heights, though many of them acquired Lebanese citizenship. When Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, Ghajar residents found themselves in a political no man’s land.

They petitioned Israel to recognize them as residents of the Golan. Israel subsequently offered them citizenship when it formally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981. Interestingly, Ghajar residents, unlike many residents of the Golan Heights, accepted Israel’s offer. During Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, Ghajar’s residents were able to travel unimpeded between Lebanon and Israel due to their dual citizenships.

When Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 2000, Ghajar was split between Lebanon and Israel in accordance with the Blue Line, which cut across the village. As a result, the village was divided, with a majority of it formally located in Lebanon to the north, while the southern portion remained in Israel.

Besides its militarily strategic position along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria tri-border, Ghajar’s boundaries scrape the Wazzani River, which is the main spring of the Hasbani River. This has led to tumultuous instances of water politics: Lebanese authorities have consistently accused Israel of trying to steal the water of the Hasbani, while Israeli authorities have been constantly worried about Lebanon diverting the waters of the Hasbani River.

During the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel took control of the whole village. unsc Resolution 1701, which ended the war, called on Israel to withdraw from the northern section of Ghajar. Israel, however, has not obliged, citing security considerations: in 2005, Hezbollah tried to kidnap Israeli soldiers stationed in the southern section of the village, and in the 2006 war, Ghajar was a fiercely contested area. The occupation of the northern section of Ghajar by Israel has thus reinforced both Lebanon’s claim that Israel’s withdrawal is not complete and Hezbollah’s right of muqawamah.

LAST BUT not least, the village of Kfar Shouba and its hills are another point of contention between Israel and Lebanon. Located in Lebanon, next to the Shebaa Farms and the Golan Heights, the village commands a military strategic position due to its location overlooking northern Israel and the Bekaa Valley. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization used the village as a steppingstone to conduct sabotage activities in Israel. In response, Israel heavily shelled the village and its hills and carried out punitive military missions there. In 1972, Israel occupied the village for a short period of time.

Then, during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon (1978–2000), the Israel Defense Forces and their proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army, used the village as an important observation post. Subsequently, Israel withdrew from the village but kept occupying the hills and the lands of Kfar Shouba in proximity to Israel’s border for security reasons. In the 2006 war, most of the village’s homes were either destroyed or damaged.

As was the case with Shebaa and Ghajar, Lebanon and Hezbollah have insisted on their right to resist Israel’s occupation until the hills of Kfar Shouba are retrieved.

Taking all of this under consideration, it is clear that the Trump administration’s mission of mediating between Israel and Lebanon so as to demarcate their maritime and land borders and pacify their tinderbox border is no small feat. Yet, in a painstaking and persistent manner, the administration, led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Satterfield, has used the right dose of diplomacy, statecraft, and at times, pressure to bring the two antagonists to agree on an initial set of measures to address their longstanding grievances.

Satterfield, in a space of two weeks in May, was able to bring the two countries to tentatively agree to meet and hold negotiations at the unifil headquarters in Naqoura in south Lebanon. Reportedly, Lebanon and Israel are close to establishing a framework for negotiations under un auspices. Lebanon’s demands and Israel’s objections to hold the negotiations under the auspices of the un were met by having the United States act as an overseer. So as to avoid the public appearance of speaking to the enemy, the two sides are sending military officers to hold the negotiations. Similarly, Israel apparently sent a “positive” message with Satterfield to Lebanon: it will reconsider the demand that negotiations should be limited to six months instead of there being no limit at all.

Satterfield was apparently able to ensure from Lebanese president Michel Aoun, a political ally of Hezbollah, a promise of his country’s “unified position” regarding linking the demarcation of both the maritime and land borders. In contrast to Hezbollah’s loud and bellicose rhetoric, President Aoun has reportedly stressed to Satterfield that, although Hezbollah is viewed as a legitimate resistance movement with popular support and representation in the government, demarcation of both the land and maritime borders with Israel is imperative to peace in the region. American and Israeli authorities have been concerned about Hezbollah taking a divergent stance regarding the talks. To be sure, reports from the president’s office indicate that Hezbollah’s view of maintaining the peace along the borders with Israel is at the heart of its tacit endorsement of the president’s “unified position.”

Hezbollah’s main concern has been about Washington using its mediation of the border disputes as a condition to degrade the deterrence of Hezbollah’s missiles.

Evidently, Satterfield, along with members of his team, showed President Aoun, Speaker of the House Nabih Berri, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Army Commander General Joseph Aoun pictures of the missiles and their respective locations. But the U.S. delegation did not make a link between the issue of the missiles and that of border demarcation. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, in a recent fiery speech on Jerusalem Day (Also known as Quds Day, an event inaugurated by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 to express solidarity with Palestinians and opposition to Zionism), admitted that Hezbollah does not have factories to develop precision missiles, but asserted that the “Americans have no business with this. It is our right to have weapons to defend our countries.”

Notwithstanding Hezbollah’s rhetoric, Lebanon would like to resolve its maritime border dispute with Israel in order to access nearby oil and gas resources. Beirut is already set to start drilling in December, with a later date in the disputed block with Israel. The country could certainly use the economic boost: Lebanon’s government is burdened with a heavy international debt estimated at more than $85 billion, comprising over 150 percent of its gdp. And its income from the tourism sector, a major component of the economy, is virtually in doubt, given the ongoing crisis in Syria and the heightening tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and Hezbollah on the other. Meanwhile, many Lebanese across the communal divide have been deeply affected by the country’s weak economy and severe power shortages.

No less significant is Hezbollah and its Shia partisans’ need for this potential new energy revenue. After all, the Hezbollah’s military wing has been fighting a costly war in Syria, while at home, U.S. sanctions have significantly reduced the organization’s revenue stream. Conversely, Israeli energy minister Yuval Steinitz’s office released a statement emphasizing that the talks could be “for the good of both countries’ interests in developing natural gas reserves and oil.”

IT BEHOOVES the Trump administration to separate this current Lebanon-Israel negotiation from the separate but also ongoing Israeli-Palestinian “deal of the century.” Lebanese parties and groups across the political divide are worried that the Trump administration is seeking to put pressure on Lebanon to bring it on board with its proposed Israeli-Palestinian deal, namely via the suggestion that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should be granted Lebanese citizenship.

This central concern is intensified by the presence of approximately one million Syrian refugees and thousands of their Lebanese-born children whose repatriation to their homeland is not certain. The Shia, Christian and Druze communities will refuse any attempt to formally settle and/or nationalize Palestinian or Syrian refugees, since most of them are Sunnis. Doing so would result in the collapse of Lebanon’s delicate religious balance, and with it, its communal peace.

The United States has deftly capitalized on the rising tension in the region, the threat of war, and the delicate existing economic and political dynamics to pursue quietly a channel of diplomacy with Israel and Lebanon. During Satterfield’s recent July shuttle diplomacy though, a couple of problems have surfaced that have left both sides frustrated over the delay in launching the talks. According to Lebanese and Israeli reports, whereas Lebanon would like to have parallel land and maritime border talks, Israel will not sign off on a written commitment to simultaneously pursue these.

Israel, for its part, would like the talks to focus solely on the maritime border. This is partly because Jerusalem worries that, since the un regards them as part of the Golan Heights tri-border dispute, including the Shebaa Farms in the negotiations would add a complicating Syrian dimension to the talks.

Moreover, whereas Beirut insists that the un should sponsor the talks with U.S. mediation, Jerusalem has asserted the preeminent role of the United States in mediating the talks, partly because Israel is not a signatory of the un Convention for the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, despite this frustration and these impediments, both capitals believe that it is in their interest to reach a compromise and launch the talks.

If the two countries were to reach an agreement on the demarcation of their borders, that would by itself be a significant foreign policy achievement, reducing the threat of a devastating war to a minimum. Pending the final framework and unfolding of the negotiations, an agreement over the disputed maritime borders could either promote a parallel agreement over the more complicated land borders or provide a critical incentive to keep the border quiet. This is extremely important for a region that is, according to an Arabic saying, “standing on the palm of Afrit (a malevolent supernatural being).”

*Robert G. Rabil is professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University (FAU). He is the author of numerous books, most recently White Heart (2018). The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of FAU.

The post دراسة موسعة للأستاذ الجامعي روبرت رابيل تتناول دور الوساطة الأميركية بين لبنان وإسرائيل لحل المشاكل الحدود البرية والبحرية بينهما بهدف البدأ بالإستفادة من مخزوني الغاز والبترول/Robert G. Rabil/The National Interest: The Trump Administration Is Tackling One of the World’s Most Dangerous Border Disputes appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

المطران الياس عودة: ما يعيشه البعض باسم الحرية من تفلت وغوغائية وضياع للقيم هو تذرع غير صادق بأفكار تجرد الإنسان من صورة الله فيه
الإثنين 12 آب 2019

وطنية – ألقى متروبوليت بيروت وتوابعها للروم الأرثوذكس المطران الياس عودة عظة بعنوان “نعمة الحرية”، قال فيها: “يهدف كل تعليم أخلاقي في المسيحية إلى اقتياد الإنسان إلى الحرية الحقيقية التي تتحقق بالرب يسوع المسيح: “تعرفون الحق والحق يحرركم” (يو 8: 32). هكذا يدعونا الإنجيل، وتدعونا الكنيسة، إلى “حرية مجد أبناء الله” (رو 8: 21)، التي تتحقق عندما نحيا وصايا الرب ونسمع كلمته ونستنير بتعاليم قديسيه.

أي دعوة إلى حرية خارج الحق، وبعيدا عن المسيح وسيادته على حياتنا، هي انغلاق لقلب الإنسان وأسر الخطيئة لنفسه في الأوهام والأهواء المعابة. الحرية هي أن “لا يتسلط شيء” على الإنسان. “كل الأشياء تحل لي، لكن ليس كل الأشياء توافق. كل الأشياء تحل لي لكن لا يتسلط علي شيء” (1كو 6: 12). بهذه العبارات، أوضح الرسول بولس حدود حرية الإنسان على المستوى الأخلاقي. فالمؤمن بالرب لا يسمح لأي فكر أو ممارسة أو عقلية أن تقيده أو تحرمه من حريته الممنوحة من الله”.

أضاف: “الإنسان خلق على صورة الله ومثاله، أي على صورة حريته. هو في تكوينه كائن عقلي حر، وسيد على الخليقة، وهو مدعو إلى المحافظة على هذه النعمة الفريدة التي تميزه عن سائر المخلوقات.

هو مدعو أيضا إلى النمو في الحرية والسيادة والحكمة والإدراك، وإلى بلوغ كمال الحرية التي تعطى له في مسيرة نموه الروحي، وفي عمله على تنمية مواهبه الخلاقة، وفي العطاء والبذل والتضحية. تتحقق الحرية في المسيحية بانفتاح الإنسان على نعمة الروح القدس.

هي قدرة كل واحد منا على تحطيم أغلال الخطيئة وإبعاد كل ما من شأنه أن يؤذيه أو يدخل الظلمة إلى نفسه. هي انطلاق الإنسان إلى ملء الحياة، في التوبة والجهاد والتنقية والمحبة. هي المناعة النفسية والروحية ضد كل خطيئة وشر، والتي يقتنيها المؤمن بتمرسه على الاعتراف بخطاياه بصدق والتجائه المستمر إلى المعونة الإلهية. يحرز الإنسان الحرية بالتربية الصالحة والتدرب الشجاع على طاعة الله واستمداد القوة منه”.

وتابع: “يعطي البشر تعريفات مختلفة للحرية بحسب ما يوافق غاياتهم وتطلعاتهم. يعتبرونها قيمة أخلاقية إنسانية مجردة من كل بعد إيماني. هذه الحرية هي في حقيقة أمرها، رغم تذرعها بالدين والإنجيل في بعض البيئات، تنأى عن أي إمكانية حقيقية لتحرير الإنسان من الداخل، من ذاته وأهوائه وأوهامه الفردية والجماعية. يبقى متمسكا بأقنعته الزائفة ولا يواجه حقيقته، بل يلتهي بالشعارات والزي السائد والأمور الراهنة.

أما ما يعيشه البعض اليوم باسم الحرية من تفلت لا مسؤول، وغوغائية، وضياع للقيم، وتمحور أناني حول الذات، وإرضاء للشهوات المظلمة، فهو في حقيقته تذرع غير صادق بأفكار تجرد الإنسان من أثمن ما في حياته، من صورة الله فيه ومن إمكانية النمو وبلوغ “ملء قامة المسيح” (أف 4: 13). لا يحقق الإنسان إنسانيته إلا في المسيح، وأي كلام غير هذا هو ضياع، بل تضليل، لمن يبحث عن معنى الحياة وعن غاية الوجود”.

وقال: “واجبنا أن نصون أبناءنا من كل أذى، وممن يحاولون أن يسبوهم بأفكارهم الدهرية العالمية الغريبة عن الإنجيل وعن وصايا الرب يسوع. واجبنا أن نحميهم من كل شر متأت من كل “حرية” زائفة، وأن نقودهم، كرعاة ومعلمين وأهل، “إلى ينابيع ماء حية”. “الراعي الصالح يبذل نفسه عن الخراف” (يو 10: 11) لا سيما إذا ما “شاهد الذئب مقبلا”.

لذا، تتصدى الكنيسة بشجاعة لكل ما من شأنه أن يسيء إلى حرية أبنائها من فن أو فكر أو عادات أو انحرافات وأنماط عيش شاذة. الحرية هي صورة لكمال الله ومحبته. الله، بملء حريته، يخلق الكون من العدم، ويبدع الإنسان، ويسكب فيه نعمته، ويتدخل في تاريخ الخلاص من أجله.

الرب، من أجل عظم جلال محبته، وبحريته المطلقة، تجسد من أجلنا نحن البشر ومن أجل خلاصنا، “وقبل الصليب طوعا من أجلنا”، وفتح للانسانية جمعاء الطريق إلى “الحق والحياة” لأنه هو كان وما زال “الطريق والحق والحياة” (يو 14: 6). طاعتنا لله ولناموس المسيح هي الضمانة الوحيدة لحرية الإنسان، ولازدهار حياته “بالروح والحق” (يو 4: 23)، وللفرح الحاصل بخلاص الرب. وحدها الطاعة لله تضمن حرية الإنسانية وانعتاقها من كل شر وظلمة”.

وختم عودة: “لذلك، يفتخر الرسول بولس بأن يسمي نفسه في أكثر من رسالة “عبد يسوع المسيح” (رو 1: 1). هذه التسمية في الكتاب المقدس هي أحد أقوى التعابير عن الحرية الحقيقية التي يمكن للانسان بلوغها. هي اتحاد الإنسان الكامل بالله، وامتلاؤه من نوره الإلهي، وغلبته على كل ظلمة وقباحة وخطيئة في هذا الدهر. هذه التسمية هي الانعكاس الكامل لمحبة الله في قديسيه الممجدين بالنعمة، والذين أضحوا، بانفتاحهم الكامل على النعمة المحيية والحق المحرر، آنية مختارة للثالوث القدوس. ألا جعلنا الله القدوس من عداد هذه الآنية المختارة”.

The post المطران الياس عودة: ما يعيشه البعض باسم الحرية من تفلت وغوغائية وضياع للقيم هو تذرع غير صادق بأفكار تجرد الإنسان من صورة الله فيه appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 13/2019

The post Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 13/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 13 آب/2019

اضغط هنا لقراءة نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة المفصلة، اللبنانية والعربية ليوم 13 آب/2019

ارشيف نشرات أخبار موقعنا اليومية/عربية وانكليزية منذ العام 2006/اضغط هنا لدخول صفحة الأرشيف

عناوين أقسام نشرة المنسقية باللغة العربية
الزوادة الإيمانية لليوم
تعليقات الياس بجاني وخلفياتها
الأخبار اللبنانية
المتفرقات اللبنانية
الأخبار الإقليمية والدولية
المقالات والتعليقات والتحاليل السياسية الشاملة
المؤتمرات والندوات والبيانات والمقابلات والمناسبات الخاصة والردود وغيره

The post نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 13 آب/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

فَنَحْنُ جَمِيعًا، يَهُودًا ويُونَانِيِّين، عَبِيدًا وأَحْرَارًا، قَدْ تَعَمَّدْنَا في رُوحٍ وَاحِدٍ لِنَكُونَ جَسَدًا وَاحِدًا، وسُقِينَا جَمِيعًا رُوحًا وَاحِدًا. فأَنْتُم جَسَدُ المَسِيح، وأَعْضَاءٌ فِيه، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ كَمَا قُسِمَ لَهُ
رسالة القدّيس بولس الأولى إلى أهل قورنتس12/من12حتى13/27-30//:”يا إخوتي، كَمَا أَنَّ الجَسَدَ هُوَ وَاحِد، ولَهُ أَعْضَاءٌ كَثِيرَة، وأَعْضَاءُ الجَسَدِ كُلُّهَا، معَ أَنَّهَا كَثِيرَة، هيَ جَسَدٌ وَاحِد، كَذَلِكَ المَسِيحُ أَيْضًا. فَنَحْنُ جَمِيعًا، يَهُودًا ويُونَانِيِّين، عَبِيدًا وأَحْرَارًا، قَدْ تَعَمَّدْنَا في رُوحٍ وَاحِدٍ لِنَكُونَ جَسَدًا وَاحِدًا، وسُقِينَا جَمِيعًا رُوحًا وَاحِدًا. فأَنْتُم جَسَدُ المَسِيح، وأَعْضَاءٌ فِيه، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ كَمَا قُسِمَ لَهُ. فقَدْ وَضَعَ اللهُ في الكَنِيسَةِ الرُّسُلَ أَوَّلاً، والأَنْبِيَاءَ ثَانِيًا، والمُعَلِّمِينَ ثَالِثًا، ثُمَّ الأَعْمَالَ القَدِيرَة، ثُمَّ مَوَاهِبَ الشِّفَاء، وَإِعَانَةَ الآخَرِين، وحُسْنَ التَّدْبِير، وأَنْوَاعَ الأَلْسُن. أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ رُسُل؟ أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ أَنْبِيَاء؟ أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ مُعَلِّمُون؟ أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ صَانِعُو أَعْمَالٍ قَدِيرَة؟ أَلَعَلَّ لِلجَمِيعِ موَاهِبَ الشِّفَاء؟ أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ يَتَكَلَّمُونَ بِالأَلْسُن؟ أَلَعَلَّ الجَمِيعَ يُتَرْجِمُونَ الأَلْسُن؟”

we were all baptized into one body Jews or Greeks, slaves or free and we were all made to drink of one Spirit. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it.
First Letter to the Corinthians 12/12-13//27-30/”Just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body Jews or Greeks, slaves or free and we were all made to drink of one Spirit. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it. And God has appointed in the church first apostles, second prophets, third teachers; then deeds of power, then gifts of healing, forms of assistance, forms of leadership, various kinds of tongues. Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Do all work miracles? Do all possess gifts of healing? Do all speak in tongues? Do all interpret?”

فَكُونُوا حُكَمَاءَ كَالحَيَّات، ووُدَعَاءَ كَالحَمَام
إنجيل القدّيس متّى10/من16حتى25/:”قالَ الربُّ يَسوعُ لِتلاميذِهِ: «هَا أَنَا أُرْسِلُكُم كَالخِرَافِ بَيْنَ الذِّئَاب. فَكُونُوا حُكَمَاءَ كَالحَيَّات، ووُدَعَاءَ كَالحَمَام. إِحْذَرُوا النَّاس! فَإِنَّهُم سَيُسْلِمُونَكُم إِلى المَجَالِس، وفي مَجَامِعِهِم يَجْلِدُونَكُم . وتُسَاقُونَ إِلى الوُلاةِ والمُلُوكِ مِنْ أَجْلي، شَهَادَةً لَهُم وِلِلأُمَم. وحِيْنَ يُسْلِمُونَكُم، لا تَهْتَمُّوا كَيْفَ أَو بِمَاذَا تَتَكَلَّمُون، فَإِنَّكُم سَتُعْطَونَ في تِلْكَ السَّاعَةِ مَا تَتَكَلَّمُونَ بِهِ.فَلَسْتُم أَنْتُمُ ٱلمُتَكَلِّمِيْن، بَلْ رُوحُ أَبِيْكُم هُوَ المُتَكَلِّمُ فِيْكُم. وسَيُسْلِمُ الأَخُ أَخَاهُ إِلى المَوْت، والأَبُ ٱبْنَهُ، ويَتَمَرَّدُ الأَوْلادُ عَلى وَالِدِيْهِم ويَقْتُلُونَهُم. ويُبْغِضُكُم جَمِيْعُ النَّاسِ مِنْ أَجْلِ ٱسْمِي، ومَنْ يَصبِرْ إِلى المُنْتَهَى يَخْلُصْ. وإِذَا ٱضْطَهَدُوكُم في هذِهِ المَدِينَة، أُهْرُبُوا إِلى غَيْرِهَا. فَٱلحَقَّ أَقُولُ لَكُم: لَنْ تَبْلُغُوا آخِرَ مُدُنِ إِسْرَائِيلَ حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ ٱبْنُ الإِنْسَان. لَيْسَ تِلْميذٌ أَفْضَلَ مِنْ مُعَلِّمِهِ، ولا عَبْدٌ مِنْ سَيِّدِهِ. حَسْبُ التِّلْمِيذِ أَنْ يَصِيْرَ مِثْلَ مُعَلِّمِهِ، والعَبْدِ مِثْلَ سَيِّدِهِ. فَإِنْ كَانَ سَيِّدُ البَيْتِ قَدْ سَمَّوْهُ بَعْلَ زَبُول، فَكَمْ بِالأَحْرَى أَهْلُ بَيْتِهِ؟”

Be wise as serpents and innocent as doves.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 10/16-25:”‘See, I am sending you out like sheep into the midst of wolves; so be wise as serpents and innocent as doves. Beware of them, for they will hand you over to councils and flog you in their synagogues; and you will be dragged before governors and kings because of me, as a testimony to them and the Gentiles. When they hand you over, do not worry about how you are to speak or what you are to say; for what you are to say will be given to you at that time; for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaking through you. Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his child, and children will rise against parents and have them put to death; and you will be hated by all because of my name. But the one who endures to the end will be saved. When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next; for truly I tell you, you will not have gone through all the towns of Israel before the Son of Man comes. ‘A disciple is not above the teacher, nor a slave above the master; it is enough for the disciple to be like the teacher, and the slave like the master. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebul, how much more will they malign those of his household!”

The post نَحْنُ جَمِيعًا، يَهُودًا ويُونَانِيِّين، عَبِيدًا وأَحْرَارًا، قَدْ تَعَمَّدْنَا في رُوحٍ وَاحِدٍ لِنَكُونَ جَسَدًا وَاحِدًا، وسُقِينَا جَمِيعًا رُوحًا وَاحِدًا. فأَنْتُم جَسَدُ المَسِيح، /وأَعْضَاءٌ فِيه، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ كَمَا قُسِمَ لَهwe were all baptized into one body Jews or Greeks, slaves or free and we were all made to drink of one Spirit. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it. appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Mother of Islamist Terror Groups
مضر زهران: جماعة الإخوان المسلمين هم أم جماعات الإرهاب الإسلامية
Mudar Zahran/American Thinker/August 13/2019

When the average American hears the term “radical Islamists” or thinks “terrorism,” the first notion that comes to mind is groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Taliban, or Hamas.

In reality, the world’s wholesale terror producer is none of the above, is headquartered in Jordan, works hand-in-hand with the monarchy there, and has evil tentacles that stretch across the globe wherever democracy and free choice thrive. Named the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), they are the quintessential terrorist organization, and are evil by sheer definition – they, strike fear into the hearts of man.

Unknown to many Americans, the MB was established over 80 years ago in Egypt, and is clearly the largest, most organized, wide-spread and best-financed radical Muslim group in the world today.

The MB is so large and important to the history of the region that they boast a very specialized group of graduates: Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and ISIS caliph Abu Baker Baghdadi – to name a few.

Osama Bin Laden was personally indoctrinated and trained by Jordanian MB leader, Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Terrorism is so accepted, supported and encouraged by the Jordanian Monarchy, that Bin Laden was allowed to freely travel to Jordan to receive a “moral education from Azzam.” I remember as a teenager in Jordan seeing a weird looking tall man wearing a turban driving around my neighborhood in his Chevy with Saudi license plates. Eventually, that man became responsible for the 911 terrorist attacks, his name was Osama Ben Laden. And he was visiting Dr. Azzam who lived on our block in AlJubiha, Amman.

Ayman Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s second in command, who is still alive, began his terroristic career as an MB member in Egypt.

ISIS’s caliph, Abu Baker Baghdadi, was also an MB member according to statements issued by ISIS itself.

The MB’s operations as a “terror university’ is so commonplace, interwoven and approved in Jordan that graduates openly do political business with the king’s regime.

In fact, many forget that Hamas was originally founded as the “Palestine Chapter of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood”. This was confirmed by Osama Abu Irshaid, a Jordanian, PhD in his dissertation at a renowned British university.

The evil spawned by the MB has spread throughout the Middle East, and since its inception, has proudly carried out hundreds of terror attacks against Israeli civilians. The MB has also been a strong participant in the creation of at least 2 wars between Israel and Gaza along with dozens of skirmishes, and their Hamas branch was responsible for carrying out a bloody coup in 2006 when it took Gaza by force and butchered Palestinian civilians.

One of the things that makes the MB so effective is the value of the “AlWalaa Wal Taa” or “Loyalty and obedience” concept. The MB controls their ranks with that concept, and as such, their global headquarters are in plain sight in downtown Amman, and they have been rewarded with friendship with a corrupt Hashemite king who has turned his back on their activities because he profits financially.

All this is happening with open approval, while most Arab states and internationally recognized nations ban the MB and designate it as a terror organization. To add insult to injury, the King of Jordan has been ignoring open calls from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to ban the MB.

One of the king’s ministers, Bassam Hadaddin, has said in an AlJazeera interview that “The Muslim Brotherhood is a part of the Hashemite regime”.

So, if the MB is outlawed in other countries, why are they so important to Jordan’s king? First, they operate outside the military, as a sort of para-military squad that operates at the King’s request and protects him from being overthrown. For example, the MB stood up for him during the November 2012 Jordanian revolution, attacking protesters while proclaiming: “We won’t allow the King to fall”.

Second, the king knows that his time is up, and in rigged elections, handed the Jordanian parliament over to the MB in what can only be described as a scorched earth policy. Although Jordan is made up of over 75% Palestinians who hate the MB with a passion, despite their hatred for Israe, during the last elections, the king who hand picks all candidates allowed the MB to gain just under half of the Parliamentary seats available. Additionally, the MB’s governing board (Majlis Shura) has only 3 Jordanians of Palestinian heritage on it out of 100 members. Combined, Jordan’s Palestinian majority are not represented by the Hashemite’s or the MB, and it’s no wonder that the people are revolting against the King – he has embraced an enemy of the people, the MB.

With this backing and support, the very westernized King helps the MB promote their hatred against America, and Jews, as well as all those who oppose him and his reign because it benefits him. For example, while the king openly bans most forms of secular political movements, its ok to demonstrate and promote antisemitism, and this allows the MB to operate their TV stations, newspapers and a $3 billion trust fund in broad daylight. This allows his subjects to ‘vent’ — but at Jews, not him, allowing him to hide the truth from his people as to the real status of a bankrupt Jordan.

Additionally, with the King’s help and knowledge, the MB uses mosques and recruiting centers to preach terror and hatred against the West, the US, Israel and Jews. This means that MB values are fully commissioned and approved by the King’s regime, because with clampdowns on free press, it is impossible to operate without the King’s knowledge and permission.

This is not a case of a weak king playing an anti-Israeli/anti-US rhetoric to appease the public. He is leading this, not following it. The king appeared on TV, wearing his military uniform, saying “Israel is butchering our children every five minutes in Jerusalem and Gaza” and blaming it on Zionists.

The king is using the MB very efficiently, he’s mobilizing the evil they stand for to support terrorism, violence and instability in the region. The King and the MB are using their resources to promote antisemitism, hatred for America and stall the peace process, putting people’s lives in jeopardy.

There are other Arab regimes who support the MB. Qatar, for example, has been the MB’s cash cow. It’s TV network, Aljazeera, has been the MB’s mouthpiece. In fact, Qatar makes no secret of its ties to MB leaders.

It is essential for America’s security to declare the MB a terror organization. US legislators must treat this as a priority. It is also vital that the US straightens out Arab dictators who support the MB, and consider plan Bs for ailing Arab dictators who have built their thrones on MB support at the expense of regional stability.

*Mudar Zahran is the Secretary General of the Jordan Opposition Coalition

The post مضر زهران: جماعة الإخوان المسلمين هم أم جماعات الإرهاب الإسلامية/Mudar Zahran/American Thinker:The Muslim Brotherhood, Mother of Islamist Terror Groups appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Time to Change Course on the UN’s Lebanon Policy
الجنرال الإسرائيلي المتقاعد عساف أويون/معهد واشنطن: حان الوقت لتغيير مسار سياسة قوات الأمم المتحدة العاملة في جنوب لبنان
Assaf Orion/The Washington Institute/August 13, 2019

Serious change is required to avoid decisions that accommodate Hezbollah’s ends, ways, and means, and a vital first step is to look at current policy mechanics with a clear eye.

With this month marking the thirteenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the end of the 2006 Lebanon war, the council will soon hold its yearly debates about renewing the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. Contrasting the Secretary General’s latest report on 1701 with thirteen years of lessons learned reveals a clear pattern: the victory of consciously false hopes over hard experience, particularly when viewed from Israel’s perspective. Breaking this pattern will require substantial changes to the force’s size, mission, and conduct.

UNDERGROUND TUNNELS, ON-THE-GROUND REALITY
From December 2018 to January 2019, the Israel Defense Forces’ Operation Northern Shield exposed Hezbollah’s secret cross-border tunneling project, a mainstay in the group’s plans for future offensives into Israel. Although the operation neutralized the tunnels and demonstrated Israel’s intelligence superiority over Hezbollah, it also provided irrefutable proof that the UN’s approach to Lebanon is broken. Time and again, when faced with Israeli “allegations” regarding such activity, the UN has professed that it is “not in a position to substantiate them independently,” preferring to remain in the dark instead. In the end, the IDF exposed, documented, and destroyed six tunnels, but the most the secretary-general’s July 17 report could say about the evidence was that “UNIFIL has verified the existence of five tunnels, three of which it confirmed crossed the Blue Line.” This short sentence encapsulates UNIFIL’s willful failure to detect a multi-year, multi-site, heavy-earthwork project that flagrantly violated UNSCR 1701 right under the noses of UN forces.

On December 26, for example, UNIFIL commander Maj. Gen. Stefano Del Col personally witnessed liquid concrete gushing out of a “cement factory” in Kafr Kila, Lebanon, after it was pumped into a tunnel on the Israeli side of the border. He then “informed the Lebanese authorities…urging immediate follow-up action.” On March 15, President Michel Aoun “committed to launch an investigation.” On May 23 and again on June 3, Lebanese Armed Forces commander Joseph Aoun confirmed “that the LAF was taking action to gain access to the sites.” As of July 17, however, “UNIFIL still has not been able to access all relevant locations north of the Blue Line,” and the secretary-general was reduced to calling on the LAF “to expeditiously undertake and conclude all necessary investigations on the Lebanese side to…prevent any similar occurrences in the future.” He also asked “the Lebanese authorities and the LAF to make further efforts to ensure that UNIFIL is fully able to implement its mandate.”

Tunnels are hardly the only issue on which the UN combines consciously false expectations with ready evidence of their futility. As in past documents stretching back to 2006, the July 17 report calls for “the disarmament of armed groups,” for the never-to-ripen “national defense strategy” dialogue, and for the long-awaited deployment of the “model regiment.” Even the most basic expectation—that Lebanon prosecute individuals who attack UN forces—is left dangling. On August 4, 2018, a group of twenty people attacked a UNIFIL patrol in the village of Majdel Zoun. A year later, Lebanese authorities still “have not provided an explanation as to why the conclusions of the LAF diverged significantly from those of UNIFIL. The UN has not been informed of criminal proceedings to date to bring the perpetrators to justice.” In response, the UN simply “continues to engage with the Lebanese authorities to request updates on this incident.” Efforts to conclude legal proceedings against other Lebanese individuals who attacked peacekeepers—in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2014, even as far back as 1980—have been just as fruitless.

In addition, the July 17 report once again obfuscates the military reality in south Lebanon through a “UNIFIL by the numbers” approach, declaring that 10,292 troops have conducted “13,884 monthly operational activities” and “7,458 patrols” while maintaining “an operational footprint in all municipalities and villages in its area of operations.” Such figures give an impression of omnipresent effectiveness, but UNIFIL’s actual presence in Lebanon is largely holed up. The steep rise in operational tempo reported since summer 2017 accrued no distinguishable increase in findings, and the footprint of attacks and harassment against patrols sprawls all over the south. Worse yet, these clashes are largely papered over—by the time a field unit’s incident report completes its long route through numerous UNIFIL command levels, UNIFIL political advisors, the UN special coordinator’s office in Beirut, various departments at UN headquarters, and the secretary-general’s office, its details and significance are greatly reduced.

Likewise, UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force reportedly “hailed 2,765 vessels” in the past four months, “of which 801 were inspected and cleared by the Lebanese authorities”—numbers that seem impressive until one realizes that only one arms ship has been seized since 2006, and its cargo was destined for Syrian rebels rather than Hezbollah. Israel’s recent claims that Iran has been shipping weapons manufacturing equipment to Beirut suggest that UNIFIL’s robust hailing record is futile as long as final clearance is conducted by complicit Lebanese authorities.

Yet the crowning jewel of untruth in the latest UN report rests in the following statement: “UNIFIL continued to assist the LAF in establishing an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those belonging to the Government of Lebanon and to UNIFIL.” As the UN is fully aware, the LAF has done nothing to establish this monopoly of arms along the border with Israel. And since UNIFIL is admittedly assisting with whatever the LAF is actually doing in the south, the UN is supporting a Lebanese policy that endorses continued Hezbollah violations.

Meanwhile, UNIFIL has called on the Israel Defense Forces “to suspend its construction works in the Lebanese ‘reservation’ area until an agreement [is] reached between the parties,” referring to portions of the Blue Line that Lebanon has disputed for years and blocked any substantive steps to demarcate or resolve. In other words, the UN has adopted Beirut’s narrative and claims, undermining its own duties as custodian of the Blue Line and calling Israel out for taking basic defensive measures along that frontier.
CORRECTING COURSE

Currently, the Lebanese government is part of the problem, not part of the solution. UNIFIL is blindfolded to collusion between its LAF host and Hezbollah, and unable to obtain justice when its forces are repeatedly attacked. This obstruction is perpetrated by Lebanon’s full national chain of command, from the president and the LAF commander down to the field level. The government has also regularly used “private property” claims over the past decade with the aim of blocking UNIFIL’s access to illicit Hezbollah military sites, including observation posts, rocket launching sites, arms depots, and attack tunnels. The UN has willingly respected these claims.

How does one explain this policy of seemingly deliberate futility? Fearing Hezbollah attacks, UNIFIL and its contributing countries apparently prefer to bide time, sidestep problems, and obscure reality. They have also focused on cultivating Lebanese support by providing hundreds of jobs and funding local projects, even though such assistance only perpetuates Hezbollah’s emboldened violations.

Changing this situation requires one to differentiate fact from fiction. In 2006, the authors of UNSCR 1701 rightly identified Hezbollah’s uncontrolled military presence in the south as the war’s main enabler and the most likely cause of future conflicts. Yet the mechanism proposed to remove this presence—Beirut’s commitment “to extend its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces”—is no longer a valid premise for policymaking. With Iran’s help, Hezbollah and its political allies now dominate Lebanon’s government, completely undercutting Beirut’s willingness and ability to fulfill its commitments. Attentive to its political masters, the LAF will likewise keep perpetuating the problem if the current circumstances persist. Automatically and unconditionally renewing UNIFIL’s mandate while allowing it to continue providing funding and jobs in Lebanon will never push the government out of its comfort zone, and years’ worth of generous and unconditioned aid to the LAF has only exacerbated the situation.

Accordingly, UNIFIL is past due for a thorough policy review and changes, based on the following principles and actions:

Prevent war. The only way to stave off another destructive conflict in Lebanon is to address Hezbollah’s military violations and hold it accountable. UNIFIL’s liaison and de-escalation functions—including the tripartite mechanism—can help meet this goal.

Promptly address pending security issues. The UN should demand immediate UNIFIL access to all tunnel-related sites. It should also demand that Beirut provide the names of all assailants who carried out the Majdel Zoun attack on its forces, as well as immediate, time-limited legal proceedings against them.

Stop “business as usual.” More generally, UNIFIL should demand immediate, unimpeded access to all relevant sites in its area of operations, total freedom of movement sans LAF escort, and absolute cessation of all aggression and harassment against its patrols.

Uphold UN responsibilities against Lebanese pretexts. All Lebanese “private property” claims that prevent full UNIFIL access should be flatly revoked. The UN should also insist on the Blue Line’s integrity in its entirety, regardless of Lebanese “reservations” seeking to undermine it. These reservations will be addressed in future border talks between Lebanon and Israel.

Stop appeasing Hezbollah. UNIFIL should stop funding projects and hiring workers in areas where its patrols are harassed or attacked. Cutting funds for communities that support Hezbollah would have the added benefit of increasing financial pressure against the organization.

Enhance UNIFIL’s transparency. Detailed geo-reporting and chronological analysis would help illustrate how UNIFIL’s military activities and civilian projects are being conducted right alongside areas where Hezbollah’s preponderant forces operate.

Beef up UN documentation. UN reports should provide updates on all cases awaiting closure by Lebanese authorities, not just cases from the latest reporting period.

Downsize UNIFIL. Despite hopes of improved UNIFIL performance, the force’s current size will never translate into efficacy given Hezbollah’s local dominance and the UN’s general risk aversion. UNIFIL’s current performance, measured by effect rather than effort, could be met with a 3,000-strong force and a robust liaison branch. The larger the force, the more likely UN troops are to serve as Hezbollah’s human shields in one of the world’s densest and deadliest conflict zones.

A simple first step would be to lower UNIFIL’s size cap from 15,000 troops to its actual current size, around 10,000. Next would be a 10-20 percent reduction—perhaps the removal of 1,000-2,000 troops, one naval vessel, and $60-120 million in budget. Further cuts should be made over time depending on Lebanon’s fulfilment of commitments and UNIFIL’s safety and freedom. This dynamic would help the international community regain some leverage over Beirut while increasing pressure on Hezbollah. UNIFIL may gradually proceed toward a 60-70 percent cut, leaving it with 3,000 troops and a $180 million budget.

Retool LAF assistance and consider targeted sanctions. Given the realities of UN bureaucratic inertia and power structures, rallying support for these recommendations may be easier to do bilaterally with officials in the United States and, perhaps, Europe. Moreover, real change means reshaping not just UNIFIL, but international policy toward Hezbollah and the LAF. More nations need to follow the U.S. and British example of designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The supposed environmental NGO “Green Without Borders”—a known facade for Hezbollah military operations—should be designated and sanctioned as well.

As for the LAF, even UN reports show how Lebanese commanders, units, and organs are deeply complicit with Hezbollah. Foreign officials may therefore wish to consider whether the recent U.S. designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a worthwhile model for portions of Lebanon’s military. There is already sufficient evidence to sanction LAF Military Intelligence and certain individual officers for their affiliation with Hezbollah. At the very least, international support for the LAF should refocus on border security and counterterrorism, and aid should be conditioned on performance and personnel vetting.

Thirteen years’ worth of observation and practice is more than enough to recognize the system’s glaring flaws and the best means of fixing them. UNIFIL and the LAF can both be part of the solution, but only if they are dislodged from their current symbiosis with Hezbollah.

Brig. Gen. Assaf Orion, IDF (Res.), participated in the IDF-UNIFIL-LAF tripartite mechanism between 2006 and 2008. He also headed the IDF delegation to the tripartite talks between 2010 and 2015.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/time-to-change-course-on-the-uns-lebanon-policy

The post الجنرال الإسرائيلي المتقاعد عساف أويون/معهد واشنطن: حان الوقت لتغيير مسار سياسة قوات الأمم المتحدة العاملة في جنوب لبنانAssaf Orion/The Washington Institute:Time to Change Course on the UN’s Lebanon Policy appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

MbS and MbZ: Could Yemen crisis end the Saudi-UAE partnership?
سيمون هندرسن من موقع الهيل: محمد بن سلمان ومحمد بن زايد: ترى هل الأزمة في اليمن ستكون السبب في انهاء الشراكة السعودية -الأمارتية
Simon Henderson/The Hill/August 13/2019

One of the “givens” of the new Middle East that has emerged in the past four years is the close partnership between Saudi Arabia and its smaller Gulf neighbor, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). More particularly, it has been the close personal relationship between its two de facto leaders, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the richest emirate in the UAE.

“MbS” and “MbZ,” as they are called, are two significant characters in the dramas of today’s regional conflicts. Crucially for Washington, their views on issues ranging from the threat of Iran and the possibilities for Middle East Peace overlap considerably (although not totally) with those of the White House.

But things may be changing. The relationship is being tested and many players, as well as observers, are watching closely. The knock-on effects could affect the region from the sands of Libya to the Strait of Hormuz. A common thread is oil.

This week the focus is on Yemen, where both have been trying to reestablish the internationally recognized government for four years. It’s complicated: Basically, since 2015, Houthi rebels have controlled the capital, Sana, while the government has tried to function from the southern port city of Aden.

But last weekend, separatists in Aden, with the apparent support of the UAE, forced the remnants of the government to flee to the Saudi capital, Riyadh. It is clear that, policy-wise, Saudi Arabia and the UAE no longer are — choose your metaphor — on the same page or backing the same team.

Hence, there was considerable attention paid yesterday to the visit by MbZ to Mecca, where MbS’s father King Salman is hosting dignitaries who visit the holy city for the annual hajj pilgrimage. MbZ was greeted at the airport, apparently warmly, by a protocol prince and then headed for a meeting with the Saudi monarch. MbS and MbZ also reportedly had a separate meeting.

The Saudi position, at least publicly, is to call on Yemenis to dialogue “to defuse the crisis.” We await details about what that may mean, but it suggests that Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi is being encouraged to talk to those who have just kicked his forces out of Yemen. It does not appear to mean that anyone should talk to the Houthis — Riyadh, along with Abu Dhabi, view them as Iranian proxies. The Houthis certainly are supported by Tehran but whether they are “backed,” or “supplied” is a matter of considerable diplomatic and journalistic debate.

It was hard to assess MbZ’s facial expression in the official photos of his meetings with King Salman and MbS. The Arab keffiyeh (headdress) masked his face. More revealing, perhaps, was the photo on the front page of today’s Arab News, the main Saudi English-language newspaper, which shows a serious-faced MbZ trying to make a point to MbS, who is looking towards the ground.

Whether this latter photo was taken yesterday or during a previous meeting is not clear, but it does illustrate how the Yemen crisis is being spun. The apparent facts seem to be a difference on tactics, which now have created a strategic setback. The narrative we are being encouraged to believe is that MbS and MbZ, as well as their countries, are as close as ever.

The abstemious and cautious MbZ has been a crucial supporter of MbS ever since King Salman ascended to the Saudi throne in January 2015 and MbS started his meteoric rise to defense minister, deputy crown prince, crown prince and now essentially king in all but name. Along the way there has been the arrests of princes and businessmen in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton, as well as the killing of the dissident journalist, Jamal Khashoggi. MbS’s spending, including on a yacht and a chateau, also extended to buying Leonardo da Vinci’s “Salvator Mundi,” which he gifted to MbZ.

At one time, articles described MBZ as MbS’s mentor, or their relationship as a “bromance,” but the Saudi prince increasingly appears to be immune from accepting advice and guidance. Yemen probably still is a sideshow in the drama of the Middle East, but even before the latest events the UAE had started to draw down on its involvement in getting rid of the Houthi regime in Sana. MbZ is judged to be satisfied with a separate South Yemen emerging. Whether this is part of MbS’s vision, or whether he is prepared to accept new realities, is the immediate question.

*Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Follow him on Twitter @shendersongulf.
Tags Mohammad bin Salman King Salman Yemeni Crisis Houthi insurgency in Yemen Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/457199-mbs-and-mbz-could-yemen-crisis-end-the-saudi-uae-partnership

The post سيمون هندرسن من موقع الهيل/محمد بن سلمان ومحمد بن زايد: ترى هل الأزمة في اليمن ستكون السبب في انهاء الشراكة السعودية -الأمارتيةSimon Henderson/The Hill/MbS and MbZ: Could Yemen crisis end the Saudi-UAE partnership? appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Turkey’s Rising Wave of Social Protests
سونر كاجابتاي ودنيز يوكسل/معهد واشنطن: تصاعد موجهة الإحتجاجات الشعبية في تركيا
Soner Cagaptay with Deniz Yuksel/The Washington Institute/August 13/2019

This year’s Istanbul election and last year’s move to a presidential system have unified and galvanized the opposition, raising questions about Erdogan’s next move.

Ever since the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a rout in Istanbul’s June 23 mayoral race, Turkey has witnessed a rise in anti-government protests, mostly focusing on environmental issues. The wave of peaceful demonstrations—the country’s largest since the 2013 Gezi Park rallies—suggests a newfound vitality among the opposition, with potentially deep implications for Turkey’s democracy.

FROM GEZI TO GOLD MINING
In May 2013, a small group of environmentalists started a demonstration in downtown Istanbul’s Gezi Park, protesting the government’s decision to turn the park into a shopping mall. Police brutality against this group soon sparked Turkey’s largest protest movement in recent history—some 2.5 million citizens joined anti-government rallies that erupted in seventy-nine of the country’s eighty-one provinces and lasted for weeks. The government cracked down on these rallies as well, resulting in over a dozen deaths among protestors and police alike. When the demonstrations ended that August, a new era had begun in Turkey, with the police subsequently cracking down on even the smallest anti-government rally.
The ground may be shifting again this summer, however. On July 26, a small group of activists staged a peaceful protest against a gold mining project in the Ida Mountains in west Turkey. Environmentalists say the mine, which will be built through a public-private partnership, will cause mass deforestation, pollute land and water resources, and devastate the local ecosystem. Public outrage swelled when the TEMA Foundation, a Turkish NGO formed to combat soil erosion, revealed that upwards of 195,000 trees had been cut down ahead of construction—more than four times the number promised by the mining company and approved by the Ministry of Energy and National Resources.

Within days, the rally grew to tens of thousands, and protestors began calling for a halt in construction and greater public consultation on environmental issues. Energized by their shared victory in the June 23 Istanbul election, the political opposition has adopted an active role in the demonstration, with members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), and the IYI Party attending. In doing so, these politicians have downplayed their partisan identities and presented a united front.

The protests came to the forefront of domestic politics on August 5, when activists formed a kilometer-long procession called the “Great Water and Conscience Meeting” near the construction site. Hundreds of activists remain camped in the area, organizing nightly forums to discuss their demands and busing in more demonstrators daily from surrounding areas. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Turks have expressed their support online with the hashtag #KazdaginaDokunma (“Don’t touch the Ida Mountains”), and nearly half a million have signed a petition to halt the project. Indeed, participants in the demonstration hail from all over Turkey, including local residents, politicians, environmentalists, civil society organizations, students, and artists.

Other environmental issues have united the opposition recently as well. The government’s June decision to start filling the Ilisu Dam reservoir in the southeast has aroused criticism from a broad coalition of activists and politicians concerned about the irreversible ecological and cultural damage that would result from rising waters. Despite the protests, authorities have already begun relocating residents of the historic town of Hasankeyf, which will be completely submerged.
In July, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation announced plans to build a public park around Lake Salda in the southwest, an area known as Turkey’s Maldives because of its white sand beaches and crystal clear water. The announcement came after the government downgraded the lake’s protected status, no longer prohibiting all construction on the site. Activists, lawyers, and opposition politicians presented a united front against the development project, which would include the installation of bungalow houses, bathrooms, prayer rooms, and cafeterias, in part so that the site could eventually host festivals.
Images of diverse groups of citizens united against what they see as the government’s indifference to public opinion on environmental issues brings to mind the nationwide protests of 2013. So far, Ankara has not cracked down on groups protesting the projects in the Ida Mountains, Hasankeyf, or Lake Salda, but it has reaffirmed its intentions to move forward with each project.

ISTANBUL WAS A TURNING POINT
A key driver of the recent rallies has been the June 23 Istanbul election, where the AKP’s loss damaged President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s image as the “invincible politician.” Following a string of electoral victories, economic successes, and legal machinations since 2003, he has become the most powerful politician in the seventy-year history of Turkey’s multiparty democracy. Erdogan is now simultaneously head of state, government, the national police, the military (as commander-in-chief), and the parliament’s leading party. This consolidation of power, coupled with frequent crackdowns on protestors, left many in the opposition disheartened.

At least until Istanbul. In March, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoglu was elected as the city’s mayor—a crucial post that holds responsibility over nearly 20 percent of Turkey’s population and has served as a stepping stone to national political prominence in the past. Feeling threatened by the AKP’s loss, Erdogan used his influence with the election board and other Turkish institutions to annul the vote based on supposed “irregularities,” setting the stage for a new vote on June 23. He then mobilized his control over most Turkish media and state resources in favor of his candidate. Yet Imamoglu not only won the second round, he increased his margin of victory from round one by a whopping fifty times. The outcome was a turning point for the opposition, many of whom believe once again that Erdogan can be challenged peacefully.

COALESCING OPPOSITION
When Erdogan shifted Turkey’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential model last year, he likely did not realize he would be helping the opposition. Previously, he had won successive elections not only because he delivered strong economic growth, but also because he was blessed with a divided opposition. Nearly half of Turkey’s citizenry opposes the president, but until recently their numbers were split among disparate groups of Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, center-left and center-right factions, and conservative and liberal groups. Given this ideological constellation, the gap between opposition groups was often wider than their gap with Erdogan’s AKP.

Yet the structure of the new presidential system means that most elections are now destined to become two-party races. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round of a presidential election, the top two candidates must enter a run-off—a situation that has forced Turkey’s normally antagonistic opposition factions to hold their noses and form electoral alliances.
The first such alliance fell short in last year’s presidential race, but Imamoglu won Istanbul using the same approach, with the full spectrum of Turkey’s opposition tallying behind him. The CHP, representing leftist and social democrat voters, IYI, representing center-right and Turkish nationalist voters, and HDP, representing Kurdish nationalist and liberal voters, all backed him; even the conservative Islamist Felicity Party supported him, if indirectly. Turkey’s slowing economy has only accelerated this unity and momentum.

CONCLUSION
The last time major anti-government rallies took place in Turkey, Erdogan was able to snuff them out not only because of his power over state security organs, but also because the opposition lacked a unified platform and leadership. This time, the opposition seems more united than it was in 2013, and it might even have a symbolic leader in the person of Imamoglu, the only politician who has defeated Erdogan since 2003. It is yet to be seen if Erdogan will crack down on the new wave of rallies or try to co-opt and divide the opposition. Dissent has emerged even within his own party, with former AKP economic minister Ali Babacan, the wunderkind responsible for Turkey’s “economic miracle” in the 2000s, announcing that he will establish a new political movement. Whichever path Erdogan chooses, he will face an invigorated opposition seemingly bent on pushing Turkey’s democracy into a new phase.

*Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow at The Washington Institute and author of the forthcoming book Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East. Deniz Yuksel is a research assistant at the Institute.

The post سونر كاجابتاي ودنيز يوكسل من معهد واشنطن: تصاعد موجهة الإحتجاجات الشعبية في تركيا/Soner Cagaptay with Deniz Yuksel/The Washington Institute: Turkey’s Rising Wave of Social Protests appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

في ذكرى حرب تموز: كيف انتصر حزب الله وهُزم لبنان؟
علي الأمين/العرب/14 آب/2019

بعد ثلاثة عشر عاما على انتصار حزب الله في حرب تموز، لا يزال لبنان يدفع ثمن هذا “الانتصار” من خلال المزيد من تهميش الدولة وتراجع الهوية الوطنية والدور العربي.

لا قيامة للدولة اللبنانية إلا بإسقاط دويلة حزب الله
يصادف اليوم 14 أغسطس ذكرى نهاية ما سمي حرب تموز 2006، تلك الحرب التي أدت إلى تدمير هائل في لبنان، على مختلف المستويات العمرانية والاقتصادية وأدت إلى نتائج كارثية على مستوى تدهور الدولة اللبنانية.

من الناحية العسكرية حقق حزب الله ولا أقول لبنان، بعض الإنجازات العسكرية التي تندرج في منع إسرائيل من تحقيق انتصار عسكري كامل على حزب الله، الذي نجح في الإضرار نسبيا بالجيش الإسرائيلي، وهذا يدرج فنيا أو عسكريا في سياق الإنجاز النسبي، ودائما في خانة الإنجاز الحزبي والمكسب الإيراني.

في نهاية تلك الحرب التدميرية، قال رئيس الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي وليد جنبلاط وهو ينظر إلى مخلفات الحرب، إن “حزب الله انتصر”، وأضاف في التدليل على هذا الانتصار، وهو يعلق على صورة عملاقة وغير مسبوقة من حيث الحجم لأمين عام حزب الله السيد حسن نصرالله، وُضعت في بيروت وعلى الطريق الذي يصل المطار الدولي بوسط بيروت، “صورة نصرالله أكبر من لبنان”.

ما قاله جنبلاط، في ذلك الحين، اختصر المشهد اللبناني بعد الحرب؛ انتصر حزب الله ونصرالله أما لبنان فقد هزم.

بعد هذه الأعوام لم تتغير الصورة، حزب الله ما زال منتصرا، أما لبنان فهو في مكان آخر وبالتأكيد ليس في خانة المنتصر. ما اعتبره حزب الله انتصارا هو أنه نجح بعد هذه الحرب في إنهاء أي إمكانية جدية، لنقل القرار الاستراتيجي لسلاحه إلى الدولة اللبنانية، وباتت الاستراتيجية الدفاعية التي تعني وضع قرار السلم والحرب في لبنان بيد السلطة الشرعية اللبنانية، حديثا لا قيمة له في حسابات حزب الله.

شكلت هذه الحرب فصلا نوعيا في فصول انكفاء الدولة اللبنانية وتضعضعها لصالح صعود منطق الميليشيا، التي عززت من الاصطفافات المذهبية والطائفية، والتي عززت بدورها من مبررات وجودها، من نفوذ سلاح حزب الله الذي يرتكز في أسس وجوده على بعدين، واحد يتصل بالداخل اللبناني ويستند إلى عصب شيعي يحميه ويحتمي به، وبعد خارجي هو أنه امتداد للقوة الإقليمية الإيرانية التي أسست حزب الله واستسلم الحزب إلى الولاء المطلق لها. فعلى الرغم من ادعائه أنه مقاومة لبنانية، إلا أنه بقي ثابتا في ولائه لإيران محتكرا هذا العنوان اللبناني له، رافضا أن يكون له أي شريك في قضية تعني لبنان واللبنانيين بالدرجة الأولى.

هذه الحرب التي شهد لبنان تداعياتها ولا يزال، رسخت الهزيمة الأخطر، والانتصار الأهم لإسرائيل بعد حزب الله وإيران، أي أن الهزيمة كانت لمشروع الدولة الذي زاد تضعضعا بفضل هذا “الانتصار”، وترسخت الانقسامات الداخلية بعدما أدرك اللبنانيون أن سلاح حزب الله بات أقوى من الدولة والمجتمع، وبات يخضع لحسابات إقليمية تتجاوز قدرة لبنان على مجاراتها أو استيعابها.

وفيما كان حزب الله يبدأ عملية السيطرة والاستحواذ على لبنان مستفيدا من انتصاره وهزيمة الدولة، كان المشروع المذهبي باعتباره يعبر عن الامتداد الإيراني جوهر القوة التي يستند إليها، ولم تكن إسرائيل مستاءة من هذا الصعود، طالما أنه تعبير عن انقسام المجتمع اللبناني، ولأنه كذلك فهو عنصر حماية موضوعي لأمنها الذي شهد منذ ذلك الحين استقرارا غير مسبوق على طول الحدود مع لبنان، وذلك كان يترافق مع تراجع وانكفاء عربي إقليمي، بدأ لبنان يدفع ثمنه لاحقا ولا يزال بشكل كبير اقتصاديا وماليا واجتماعيا.

وجاءت الثورة السورية لتكشف بوضوح لا لبس فيه، أن القوة الإيرانية على حدود إسرائيل ولاسيما حزب الله، هي قوة نفوذ إيراني بالدرجة الأولى، وأن وظيفة السلاح حماية هذا النفوذ، ولم تكن وظيفته تحرير القدس. لذلك كان الزخم العسكري الذي استخدمه حزب الله في سوريا، لا يمكن مقارنته بحجم ما قام به ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي منذ نشأ حزب الله، فحجم المعارك وعديدها التي خاضها على امتداد الأراضي السورية، وأعداد الضحايا الذين سقطوا من جنوده في مواجهة الثورة السورية يفوق عدد الذين سقطوا في معاركه ضد إسرائيل، وهذا لم يكن من دون آثار عميقة في بنية حزب الله ومنهجه السياسي والأيديولوجي، الذي باتت الهوية السياسية المذهبية العنصر المحدد لخياراته، التي جعلته أكثر انسجاما مع مشروع حلف الأقليات.

مع كل الانتصارات التي قال رئيس كتلة حزب الله البرلمانية النائب محمد رعد الاثنين الماضي أنها تحققت لمحور إيران في المنطقة العربية في العراق واليمن وسوريا ولبنان، فإن المفارقة أن انتصار إيران وحزب الله انتصار متلازم مع هزيمة الدولة وتفسخ المجتمع، ومع ترسيخ الكيان الإسرائيلي ليس في فلسطين فحسب، بل في نفوذه الذي بات ممتدا على طول المنطقة العربية وعرضها. فيما المجتمعات العربية في الدول المذكورة، لم تعان في تاريخها من هذا التشظي في الهوية الوطنية والقومية وحتى الهوية الإسلامية كما هي اليوم.

قبل يومين هزّ انفجار ضخم قاعدة “صقر” العسكريّة جنوبي العاصمة العراقيّة، بغداد، للمرّة الثالثة خلال أسابيع. وتبين بحسب ما سربت وسائل إعلام عدة ومنها إسرائيلية، “أنها ضربات قامت بها طائرات إسرائيلية”، ولكن المحور الإيراني لم يقم بأي رد على هذه الضربات كحال مئات الضربات التي طالت مواقعه في سوريا من قبل إسرائيل أيضا.

في المقابل أكد القيادي في حزب الله محمد رعد “أننا جاهزون لتلقينها درسا” ولكن الدرس الذي يتحدث عنه رعد، هو على الأرجح إعلان نهاية لبنان الذي بات عاريا من كل عناصر القوة، بحيث أن السلاح الذي يمتلكه حزب الله لا قيمة له وطنيا طالما أن قرارا أميركيا يصدر عن وزارة الخزانة الأميركية، كفيل بأن يسقط لبنان ماليا واقتصاديا، وطالما أن لبنان يستجدي المساعدات الأوروبية والأميركية والعربية.

قبل أيام كان كافيا أن تصدر السفارة الأميركية بيانا تحذيريا للحكومة اللبنانية بشأن استغلال سلطة القضاء لتصفية حسابات سياسية، لتسارع الحكومة وعلى رأسها حزب الله لإزالة العوائق أمام اجتماع مجلس الوزراء، ولتتوقف الحملة على وليد جنبلاط.

بعد ثلاثة عشر عاما على انتصار حزب الله في حرب تموز، لا يزال لبنان يدفع ثمن هذا “الانتصار” من خلال المزيد من تهميش الدولة وتراجع الهوية الوطنية والدور العربي، ويقدم النموذج للدولة الفاشلة وعلى قدرة الدويلة التي مثلها حزب الله على أن توفر الأرضية الملائمة لتمدد الدول الإقليمية ولاسيما إسرائيل.

وإن كان هذا الواقع قاسيا على اللبنانيين وعلى غيرهم من العرب، فإنه يؤكد حقيقة لا مفر منها في أي تفكير نهضوي وطني وقومي، هو أن لا قيامة لمجتمع إلا بالدولة، ولا قيامة للدولة إلا بإسقاط الدويلة، تلك التي تلبس قناع المقاومة حينا، وقناع الدين أحيانا، والمذهب أحيانا أخرى.

The post علي الأمين/في ذكرى حرب تموز: كيف انتصر حزب الله وهُزم لبنان؟ appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

الأولويات الإستراتيجية في اليمن
د. وليد فارس: انديبندت عربية/13 آب/2019

أحداث عدن الأخيرة دفعت المراقبين إلى إعادة النظر في تطور السياسات تجاه البلاد.

الأحداث الأخيرة التي عصفت بمدينة عدن اليمنية، منذ تعرضها لعمليات إرهابية استهدفتها من قبل الحوثيين وجماعات القاعدة، ورد فعل القوى الجنوبية التي سارعت إلى السيطرة على المواقع الحكومية وإعلان نواياها بإقامة سلطة جنوبية تعمل على مواجهة الإرهاب من ناحية، ومساندة التحالف العربي من ناحية ثانية، دفعت بالمراقبين والمتابعين من واشنطن إلى إعادة النظر في تطور السياسات تجاه اليمن، سواء كانت في منطقة الشرق الأوسط أو في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية.

وفي عودة إلى بضع سنوات إلى الوراء نرى أن أولويات أميركا وحلفائها العرب تجاه اليمن تحدّدت على الشكل التالي:

منذ الهجمات الإرهابية في 11 سبتمبر (أيلول) 2001، وصولاً إلى السنوات الأخيرة، ركزت الإدارات الأميركية المتعاقبة على موضوع مركزي في اليمن هو خطر القاعدة، وجاء بعده خطر تنظيم “داعش”.

فالجميع في واشنطن يذكر مؤامرات أنور العولقي زعيم القاعدة في اليمن، الذي أقدم على استهداف الولايات المتحدة. ومنذ تلك العمليات الإرهابية قررت واشنطن القيام بعمل دؤوب يتركز على ضرب وجود القاعدة في اليمن. وحالياً، أضافت إلى أجندتها استهداف أي وجود لـ “داعش”.

وخلال حقبة الرئيس الأميركي السابق باراك أوباما لم تتدخل الإدارة مباشرة في الحرب التي اندلعت بين القوى المؤيدة لإيران، ودول التحالف العربي وعلى رأسها السعودية والإمارات.

ومن بين الأسباب التي دفعت الإدارة السابقة إلى عدم التدخل إلى جانب حلفاء واشنطن العرب ضد الحوثيين، كان الاتفاق النووي الإيراني الذي كبّل السياسة الخارجية الأميركية في الشرق الأوسط إلى حدّ أن واشنطن كانت تضغط على حليفتيها الرياض وأبو ظبي من أجل وقف تدخلهما في اليمن ضد تنظيم اعتبرته واشنطن في ما بعد تنظيماً إرهابياً.

ومع انتخاب الرئيس دونالد ترمب تغيرت السياسة الأميركية بشكل عام ولو بسرعات متفاوتة. فأجندة واشنطن لدى اليمن لم تتغير كثيراً، خصوصاً أن أولويات ترمب كانت ولا تزال إيران في سوريا والعراق وأماكن أخرى.

في هذا الوقت استمرت الأجهزة الأميركية بمتابعة مباشرة لتحركات القاعدة واستهدافها بشتى الوسائل من دون الانغماس في الحرب الدائرة بين التحالف العربي وقوى الشرعية من جهة، والجماعة الحوثية من جهة ثانية.

وجدير بالذكر أنه حتى في ظل إدارة ترمب، فإن قوة اللوبي المؤيد لإيران ومعه اللوبي القطري الإخواني تصاعدت داخل الكونغرس بعد انتصار الديمقراطيين في انتخابات مجلس النواب، ما أدى إلى صدور مشاريع قوانين لإرغام الإدارة على وقف الدعم للسعودية والإمارات في حربهما ضد الحوثيين. لكن ترمب لم يرضخ للضغوط، وفي المقابل لم يصدر أي موقف حاسم إلى جانب التحالف في المعركة.

الحوثيون استفادوا من إطالة أمد حملة التحالف ضدهم، وغياب أميركا. فحصلوا على أسلحة من إيران أهمها طائرات الدرون، والصواريخ الباليستية التي استخدموها ضد أهداف في العمق السعودي وهددوا باستخدامها ضد الإمارات.

إلى جانب الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران، استفادت جماعة الإخوان المسلمين من عدم التعبئة الأميركية إلى جانب التحالف، فنظّمت صفوفها في اليمن عبر تنظيمات محلية وعلى رأسها حزب الإصلاح، وتموضعت إلى جانب الحكومة الشرعية زاعمة أنها تواجه الحوثيين، بينما في الواقع حشدت قوتها لتنفذ سياسات أخرى عبر السيطرة على أجزاء من اليمن الشمالي ومناطق ما كانت تعرف بدولة اليمن الجنوبي.

كانت ميليشيات الإخوان تحتمي في ظل التحالف، بينما كان إعلامها يهاجم السعودية والإمارات، ولوبياتها في واشنطن تهاجم التحالف. وفي تلك السنوات كانت هناك أزمة سياسية أخرى عنوانها الحراك في الجنوب الهادف إلى إقامة سلطات ذاتية في دولة اليمن الجنوبي. وللمفارقة شاركت قواته في الدفاع عن اليمن الموحد لا سيما بعد وصول الحوثيين إلى أبواب عدن، وأوقفت تمددهم عندما كاد اليمن الشمالي أن يختفي عن الخريطة، وضربت ألوية العمالقة التابعة للحراك بقوة، وتمكنت من تحرير الساحل الغربي بمساعدة التحالف، وطرد الحوثيين حتى تعز.

غير أن قمة التعقيدات ظهرت بعد رؤية الجنوبيين قواتهم وهي تحرر مناطق اليمن الشمالي بينما الميليشيات الإخوانية تحاول اختراق مناطقهم. وفي ظل غياب السياسة الأميركية بفعل انشغال واشنطن بملفات أخرى، وعدم قدرة التحالف على فتح معركة أخرى قبل الحسم مع الحوثيين، قامت قوات الجنوب وبجهود ذاتية بطرد ميليشيات الإخوان، التي كانت تحتمي بصفة الشرعية، من عدن، فطالبت الرياض بشكل حازم بوقف إطلاق النار وفتح حوار سريع بين المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي وحكومة عبد ربه منصور هادي.

أما واشنطن فلم تصدر أي بيان إستراتيجي لأنها تنتظر النتائج على الأرض في الجنوب وأيضاً نتائج الحوار الرباعي الذي يضم حكومة عبد ربه منصور هادي والمجلس الانتقالي والسعودية والإمارات.

مع توالي الأحداث بات واضحاً هنا أن الإستراتيجيات الماضية لم تنجح في اليمن بالسرعة المطلوبة، وبالتالي ما يجب العمل عليه رسم إستراتيجيات جديدة تعمل على الخروج من المواجهة في الجنوب وحشد طاقات جميع الأطراف لتحرير الشمال من وجود إيران العسكري. وهذا يمكن إنجازه عبر اتفاق بين الجنوبيين وحكومة هادي يجري على إثره تنسيق كامل بينهما واعتبارهما عضوين أساسيين في التحالف العربي إلى جانب السعودية والإمارات. فميدانياً، من المفضل أن يقوم الجنوب بالدفاع عن نفسه ضد القاعدة و”داعش” وتجريد الإخوان من سلاحهم، بينما تقوم حكومة هادي وجيشها بالتركيز على تحرير اليمن من ميليشيات إيران. وهذا الأمر يضمن حصولها على دعم لا محدود من الجنوب، وتتحوّل الخصومة إلى تحالف قائم على الاعتراف المتبادل، مما يؤدي إلى إراحة السعودية والإمارات. ولعلّ أزمة عدن تقلب الموازين وتسهم في تحقيق نجاح إستراتيجي سريع.

The post د. وليد فارس: الأولويات الإستراتيجية في اليمن appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 14 آب/2019

اضغط هنا لقراءة نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة المفصلة، اللبنانية والعربية ليوم 14 آب/2019

ارشيف نشرات أخبار موقعنا اليومية/عربية وانكليزية منذ العام 2006/اضغط هنا لدخول صفحة الأرشيف

عناوين أقسام نشرة المنسقية باللغة العربية
الزوادة الإيمانية لليوم
تعليقات الياس بجاني وخلفياتها
الأخبار اللبنانية
المتفرقات اللبنانية
الأخبار الإقليمية والدولية
المقالات والتعليقات والتحاليل السياسية الشاملة
المؤتمرات والندوات والبيانات والمقابلات والمناسبات الخاصة والردود وغيره

The post نشرة أخبار المنسقية العامة للمؤسسات اللبنانية الكندية باللغة العربية ليوم 14 آب/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.

Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 14/2019

Click Here to read the whole and detailed LCCC English News Bulletin for August 14/2019

The post Detailed LCCC English News Bulletin For August 14/2019 appeared first on Elias Bejjani News.